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Abstrat
Independene { the study of what is relevant to a given problem of reasoning { has
reeived an inreasing attention from the AI ommunity. In this paper, we onsider two
basi forms of independene, namely, a syntati one and a semanti one. We show features
and drawbaks of them. In partiular, while the syntati form of independene is ompu-
tationally easy to hek, there are ases in whih things that intuitively are not relevant
are not reognized as suh. We also onsider the problem of forgetting, i.e., distilling from
a knowledge base only the part that is relevant to the set of queries onstruted from a
subset of the alphabet. While suh proess is omputationally hard, it allows for a simpli-
ation of subsequent reasoning, and an thus be viewed as a form of ompilation: one the
relevant part of a knowledge base has been extrated, all reasoning tasks to be performed
an be simplied.
1. Introdution
We suessively present some motivations, the sope of the paper, and the ontribution and
the organization of the paper.
1.1 Motivations
In many situations of everyday life, we are onfronted with the problem of determining what
is relevant. Espeially, as a preliminary step to various intelligent tasks (e.g., planning, de-
ision making, reasoning), it is natural and reasonable to disard everything but what is
relevant to ahieve them eÆiently. For instane, before starting to write this paper, we had
to onsider the relevant literature on the topi, and only it; gathering on our desks all the
papers about relevane that we have at hand led us to set away our favourite ook books,
beause they are of no help to the task of writing this paper. The ability to fous on what
is relevant (or dually to disard what is not) an be onsidered as a entral, harateristi
feature of intelligene; it is believed that over 90% of the neuronal onnetions of our brains
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are inhibitory and serve to give up sensorial inputs (Subramanian, Greiner, & Pearl, 1997).
This explains why irrelevane, under various names as independene, irredundany, inu-
eneability, novelty, separability, is nowadays onsidered as an important notion in many
elds of artiial intelligene (see a survey for more details, e.g., Greiner & Subramanian,
1995; Subramanian et al., 1997).
In the following, we are onerned with relevane for reasoning. In this framework,
the task is typially that of determining whether some piee of knowledge (a query) '
an be derived from a knowledge base . Several reasoning shemes an be taken into
aount here, from the lassial one (inferene is lassial entailment) to more sophistiated
ones (ommon-sense inferene). When dealing with suh reasoning tasks, relevane is often
exploited so as to make inferene more eÆient from a omputational point of view. In other
reasoning problems, the purpose is to expliitly derive some intensionally-haraterized
piees of knowledge (e.g., tell me all what you know about Tweety). For suh problems
(that are not reduible to deision problems), relevane also has a role to play, for instane
by allowing us to haraterize the piees of information we are interested in by forgetting
the other ones.
To what extent is the goal of improving inferene reahable? In order to address this
point, a key issue is the omputational omplexity one. Indeed, assume that we know that
the resolution of some reasoning problems an be sped up one relevant information has been
eliited. In the situation where it is omputationally harder to point out suh information
from the input than to reason diretly from the input, omputational benets are hard to
be expeted. If so, alternative uses of relevane for reasoning are to be investigated. For
instane, searhing for relevane information an be limited by onsidering only piees of
knowledge that an be generated in a tratable way. If suh information depend only on the
knowledge base, another possible approah is to (tentatively) ompensate the omputational
resoures spent in deriving the relevane information through many queries (omputing
piees of relevant information an then be viewed as a form of ompilation).
1.2 Sope of the Paper
Little is known about the omputational omplexity of relevane. This paper ontributes
to ll this gap. The omplexity of several logi-based relevane relations is identied in a
propositional setting. By logi-based we mean that the notions of relevane we fous on
are not extra-logial but built inside the logi: they are dened using the standard logial
notions of (lassial) formula, model, logial dedution, et. The stress is laid on notions of
relevane that an prove helpful for improving inferene and, in partiular, the most basi
form of it, lassial entailment. Relevane is aptured by relations in the metalanguage of
the logi, that is, we formalize relevane as a relation between objets of the propositional
language (formulas or sets of literals/variables) thus expressing the fat that some objet is
relevant to some other one.
Two notions play a entral role in this paper. The rst one, (semantial) formula-
variable independene (FV-independene for short) tells that a propositional formula  is
independent from a given set V of variables if and only if it an be rewritten equivalently
as a formula in whih none of the variables in V appears. The seond one is the notion
of forgetting a given set V of variables in a formula . It is intimately linked to the
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notion of formula-variable independene beause, as we show, the result of forgetting the
set of variables V in a formula  an be dened as the strongest onsequene of  being
independent from V . Both notions have appeared in the literature under various names
and with several dierent (but equivalent) denitions, and are highly useful for many tasks
in automated reasoning and many problems in artiial intelligene:
1. automated dedution and onsequene nding. Formula-variable independene an be
useful for heking (un)satisability or for onsequene nding. Indeed, struturing
the knowledge base by nding useful independenies may be worth doing before run-
ning any searh algorithm. This priniple is at work in (Amir & MIlraith, 2000). In
optimal ases, for example, a satisability problem will be deomposed into a small
number of satisability problems on easier knowledge bases (with less variables) as
shown by Park and Gelder (1996). As to improving inferene, this an be partiu-
larly helpful in the situation where the set of queries under onsideration is limited
to formulas ' that are (syntatially or semantially) independent from a set V of
variables.
2. query answering (see in partiular Amir & MIlraith, 2000), diagnosis (see the work
by Darwihe, 1998). Rendering a formula  independent from a set V of variables
through variable forgetting gives rise to a formula that is query-equivalent to  w.r.t.
V in the sense that every logial onsequene ' of  that is independent from V
also is a logial onsequene of  one made independent from V , and the onverse
holds as well. Interestingly, the set of all the formulas independent from a set of
variables is a stable prodution eld (Siegel, 1987; Inoue, 1992), and fousing on
suh a prodution eld is valuable for several reasoning shemes. For instane, in the
onsisteny-based framework for diagnosis (Reiter, 1987), the queries we are interested
in are the onits of the system to be diagnosed, i.e., the lauses that are independent
from every variable used to represent the system, exept the abnormality propositions
used to enode the omponent failures.
3. knowledge base struturing, topi-based reasoning. Formula-variable independene is
a key notion for deomposing a propositional knowledge base (KB for short), i.e.,
a nite set of propositional formulas, into smaller subbases. Suh a deomposition
is all the more valuable as the number of variables the subbases depends on is low.
Optimally, a knowledge base  = f'
1
; :::; '
n
g is fully deomposable if it an be written
as  = 
1
[ : : : [ 
n
where 
i
and 
j
depend on disjoint sets of variables for all
i 6= j. Suh deompositions were onsidered in several papers (Parikh, 1996; Amir
& MIlraith, 2000; Marquis & Porquet, 2000) with somewhat dierent motivations.
The most intuitive motivation for searhing suh deompositions is that it gives a
better understanding of the knowledge base, by struturing it with respet to (possible
disjoint but not neessarily) sets of topis (Marquis & Porquet, 2000).
4. belief revision and inonsisteny-tolerant reasoning. Deomposing a propositional
knowledge base  into subbases f
1
; : : : ;
n
g proves also to be relevant for den-
ing inonsisteny-tolerant relations as well as belief revision operators. The approah
proposed by Chopra and Parikh (1999) proeeds as follows: the knowledge base 
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is rst partitioned into f
1
; : : : ;
n
g suh that the intersetion of the languages of
the subbases (i.e., the sets DepV ar(
i
) of variables the subbases depend on) are as
small as possible; then ' is inferred from  w.r.t. the given partition if and only if
the onjuntion of all 
i
suh that DepV ar(
i
) \ DepV ar(') 6= ; is onsistent and
entails '. In a revision situation, this approah also ensures that the only old beliefs
that may be thrown away are about the variables relevant to the input formula. Fi-
nally, as reently shown by some of the authors of the present paper, forgetting an be
advantageously exploited as a weakening mehanism for reovering onsisteny from
an inonsistent KB (Lang & Marquis, 2002).
5. belief update. A belief update operator maps a knowledge base  and an input formula
' expressing some expliit evolution of the world to a new knowledge base ';  and
' respetively represent the agent's knowledge before and after the evolution of the
world expressed by the update. Several authors argued that an update operator should
preserve the part of the knowledge base not onerned by the update. This leads to the
following three-stage proess, proposed independently by Doherty, Lukaszewiz, and
Madalinska-Bugaj (1998) and by Herzig and Ri (1998) (and named mpma and wss#,
respetively): (i) determine the variables relevant to the update, namely, DepV ar(');
(ii) forget these variables in  to obtain a new formula ForgetV ar(;DepV ar('));
(iii) expand by '. In more ompat terms, this update operator is expressed by
  ' = ForgetV ar(;DepV ar(')) ^ '. Thus, both our results on FV-independene
and variable forgetting are relevant to the omputational issues pertaining to this kind
of belief updates.
6. reasoning about ation, deision making, planning. Logial languages for reasoning
about ation express the eets (deterministi or not, onditional or not) of ations by
means of propositional formulas (Gelfond & Lifshitz, 1993; Sandewall, 1995; Fargier,
Lang, & Marquis, 2000; Herzig, Lang, Marquis, & Polasek, 2001); nding the vari-
ables the eets are dependent on enables to identify the variables whose truth value
may be hanged by the ation; moreover, formula-literal independene { a renement
of FV-independene that we introdue { also tells us in whih diretion (from false
to true and/or from true to false) the possible hange may our. This is espeially
useful for ltering out irrelevant ations in a deision making or planning problem.
7. preferene representation. Logial languages for representing preferene write elemen-
tary goals as propositional formulas and it is ruial to identify those variables that
have no inuene on the agent's preferene. Therefore, formula-variable independene
has an important role to play; for instane, the framework of so-alled eteris paribus
preferene statements of Tan and Pearl (1994) interprets a preferene item ' :  > : 
by: for any pair of worlds (!; !
0
) suh that (i) ! j=  , (ii) !
0
j= : and (iii) ! and
!
0
oinide on all variables ' and  are independent from, then we have a strit
preferene of ! over !
0
.
1.3 Contribution and Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is strutured as follows. After some formal preliminaries given in Se-
tion 2, the key notion of formula-variable independene is presented in Setion 3. Beause it
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aptures a very basi form of logi-based independene, this relation has already been intro-
dued in the literature under several names, like inueneability (Boutilier, 1994), relevane
to a subjet matter (Lakemeyer, 1997), or redundany (Doherty et al., 1998). Although it
is oneptually and tehnially simple, this notion has not been studied in a systemati way,
and our very rst ontribution aims at lling this gap, rst by giving several equivalent har-
aterizations of this notion (this is useful, as several papers introdued and used the same
onepts under dierent names), and seond by investigating arefully its omputational
omplexity. In partiular, we show that, in the general ase, heking whether a formula is
independent from a set of variables is oNP-omplete. Then, we go beyond this very simple
notion by introduing the more ne-grained notion of formula/literal independene in order
to disriminate the situation where a formula  onveys some information about a literal
but no information about its negation. This renement is helpful whenever the polarity
of information is signiant, whih is the ase in many AI elds (inluding losed-world
reasoning and reasoning about ations). We also study several interesting notions derived
from formula-variable and formula-literal independene, suh as the notion of simplied for-
mula ( is Lit- (Var-) simplied if it depends on every literal (variable) ourring in it) and
the orresponding proess of simplifying a formula. Despite this omplexity and beause
the size of a simplied formula an never be larger than the size of the original formula,
simpliation an prove a valuable relevane-based preproessing for improving many forms
of inferene.
In Setion 4, we turn to the seond key notion, namely forgetting a given set of variables
in a formula (Lin & Reiter, 1994). The forgetting proess plays an important role in many
AI tasks and has been studied in the literature under various other names, suh as vari-
able elimination, or marginalization (Kohlas, Moral, & Haenni, 1999). Several semantial
haraterizations and metatheoreti properties of forgetting are presented. Based on this
notion, we introdue an additional notion of dependene between two formulas given a set
of variables: we state that  is equivalent to  w.r.t. V if and only if both formulas are log-
ially equivalent one made independent from every variable exept those of V . Here again,
it is important to make a distintion between a variable and its negation (for instane, one
an be interested in the positive onits of a system, only). For this purpose, we introdue
a notion of literal forgetting that renes the orresponding notion of variable forgetting. We
show how losed-world inferene an be simply haraterized from the orresponding equiv-
alene relation. Finally, we identify the omplexity of both notions of equivalene and show
them to be hard (
p
2
-omplete). As a onsequene, forgetting variables or literals within a
formula annot be ahieved in polynomial time in the general ase (unless the polynomial
hierarhy ollapses at the rst level). We also show that a polysize propositional represen-
tation of forgetting is very unlikely to exist in the general ase. We nevertheless present
some restrited situations where forgetting is tratable.
Setion 5 shows FV-independene losely related to notions of irrelevane already in-
trodued in the literature by various authors. Setion 6 disusses other related work and
skethes further extensions of some notions and results studied in the paper. Finally, Se-
tion 7 onludes the paper. Proofs of the main propositions are reported in an appendix.
A glossary of the notations is at the end of this paper, right before the bibliography.
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2. Preliminaries
We rst reall some basi notions from propositional logi, and from omplexity theory.
2.1 Propositional Logi
Let PS be a nite set of propositional variables. PROP
PS
is the propositional language
built up from PS, the onnetives and the Boolean onstants true and false in the usual
way. For every V  PS, PROP
V
denotes the sublanguage of PROP
PS
generated from the
variables of V only. A literal of PROP
V
is either a variable of V (positive literal) or the
negation of a variable of V (negative literal). Their set is denoted L
V
, while L
+
V
(resp. L
 
V
)
denotes the set of positive (resp. negative) literals built up from V . A lause Æ (resp. a
term ) of PROP
V
is a (possibly empty) nite disjuntion (resp. onjuntion) of literals of
PROP
V
. A CNF (resp. a DNF) formula of PROP
V
is a nite onjuntion of lauses (resp.
disjuntion of terms) of PROP
V
. As usual, every nite set of formulas from PROP
PS
is
identied with the formula that is the onjuntion of its elements.
From now on,  denotes a propositional formula, i.e., a member of PROP
PS
. V ar() is
the set of propositional variables appearing in . If L  L
PS
, V ar(L) is the set of variables
from PS upon whih literals of L are built. Elements of PS are denoted v, x, y et.
Elements of L
PS
are denoted l, l
1
, l
2
et. Subsets of PS are denoted V , X, Y et. In order
to simplify notations, we assimilate every singleton V = fvg with its unique element v. The
size of a formula , denoted by jj, is the number of ourrenes of variables it ontains. A
propositional formula  is said to be in Negation Normal Form (NNF) if and only if only
propositional symbols are in the sope of an ourrene of : in . It is well-known that
every propositional formula  built up from the onnetives ^, _, :,) only, an be turned
in linear time into an equivalent NNF formula by \pushing down" every ourrene of : in
it (i.e., exploiting De Morgan's law) and removing double negations (sine : is involutive).
Slightly abusing words, we all the formula resulting from this normalization proess the
NNF of  and we note Lit() the set of literals from L
PS
ourring in the NNF of . For
instane, the NNF of  = :((:a^b)_) is (a_:b)^:; hene, we have Lit() = fa;:b;:g.
Note that the NNF of a formula depends on its syntatial struture, i.e., two formulae that
are syntatially dierent may have dierent NNFs even if they are equivalent.
Full instantiations of variables of V  PS are alled V -worlds
1
; they are denoted by
!
V
and their set is denoted 

V
. When A and B are two disjoint subsets of PS, !
A
^ !
B
denotes the A[B-world that oinides with !
A
on A and with !
B
on B. An interpretation
! over PROP
PS
is just a PS-world, and ! is said to be a model of  whenever it makes 
true. We denote Mod() the set of models of .
For every formula  and every variable x, 
x 0
(resp. 
x 1
) is the formula obtained
by replaing every ourrene of x in  by the onstant false (resp. true). 
l 1
(resp.

l 0
) is an abbreviation for 
x 1
(resp. 
x 0
) when l is a positive literal x and for 
x 0
(resp. 
x 1
) when l is a negative literal :x.
Given an interpretation ! and a literal l, we let Fore(!; l) denote the interpretation
that gives the same truth value as ! to all variables exept the variable of l, and suh
that Fore(!; l) j= l. In other words, Fore(!; l) is the interpretation satisfying l that is
1. The V -worlds are also alled partial models over V .
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the losest to !. For instane, provided that PS = fa; bg and !(a) = !(b) = 1, we have
Fore(!;:b)(a) = 1 and Fore(!;:b)(b) = 0. Clearly, if ! j= l then Fore(!; l) = !. If
L = fl
1
; : : : ; l
n
g is a onsistent set of literals, then Fore(!;L) is dened as
Fore(: : : (Fore(!; l
1
); : : :); l
n
):
Lastly, given an interpretation ! and a variable x, we let Swith(!; x) denote the interpre-
tation that gives the same truth value as ! to all variables exept x, and that gives to x
the value opposite to that given by !.
Two formulas 	 and  are said to be equivalent modulo a formula  if and only if
 ^	   ^ .
In this paper we use the onepts of prime impliates and prime impliants. The set of
prime impliates of a formula , denoted by IP (), is dened as:
IP () = fÆ lause j  j= Æ and 6 9Æ
0
lause s.t.  j= Æ
0
and Æ
0
j= Æ and Æ 6j= Æ
0
g:
Among all the impliates of  (i.e., the lauses entailed by ), the prime impliates
of  are the minimal ones w.r.t. j= (i.e., the logially strongest ones). The set of prime
impliants of a formula , denoted by PI(), is dened dually as:
PI() = f term j  j=  and 6 9
0
term s.t. 
0
j=  and  j= 
0
and 
0
6j= g:
Among all the impliants of  (i.e., the terms implying ), the prime impliants of 
are the maximal ones w.r.t. j= (i.e., the logially weakest ones).
Of ourse, the set of prime impliants/ates may ontain equivalent terms/lauses. We
an restrit our attemption to one term/lause for eah set of equivalent terms/lauses.
Stated otherwise, in PI() and IP (), only one representative per equivalene lass is
kept.
Example 1 Let  = fa _ b;:a ^  ) e; d , eg. The set of prime impliates of  is, by
denition,
IP () = fa _ b; a _ : _ e;:d _ e; d _ :e; a _ : _ dg:
2.2 Computational Complexity
The omplexity results we give in this paper refer to some omplexity lasses whih deserve
some realls. More details an be found in Papadimitriou's (1994) textbook. Given a
problem a, we denote by a the omplementary problem of a. We assume that the lasses
P, NP and oNP are known to the reader. The following lasses will also be onsidered:
 BH
2
(also known as DP) is the lass of all languages L suh that L = L
1
\ L
2
, where
L
1
is in NP and L
2
in oNP. The anonial BH
2
-omplete problem is sat{unsat: a
pair of formulas h'; i is in sat{unsat if and only if ' is satisable and  is not.
The omplementary lass oBH
2
is the lass of all languages L suh that L = L
1
[L
2
,
where L
1
is in NP and L
2
in oNP. The anonial oBH
2
-omplete problem is sat-
or-unsat: a pair of formulas h'; i is in sat-or-unsat if and only if ' is satisable
or  is not.
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 
p
2
= P
NP
is the lass of all languages reognizable in polynomial time by a deter-
ministi Turing mahine equipped with an NP orale, i.e., a devie able to solve any
instane of an NP or a oNP problem in unit time. F
p
2
is the orresponding lass of
funtion problems.
 
p
2
= NP
NP
is the lass of all languages reognizable in polynomial time by a nonde-
terministi Turing mahine equipped with an NP orale. The anonial 
p
2
-omplete
problem 2-qbf is the set of all triples hA = fa
1
; :::; a
m
g; B = fb
1
; :::; b
n
g;i where
A and B are two disjoint sets of propositional variables and  is a formula from
PROP
A[B
. A positive instane of this problem is a triple hA;B;i for whih there
exists a A-world !
A
suh that for all B-world !
B
we have !
A
^ !
B
j= .
 
p
2
= o
p
2
= oNP
NP
. The anonial 
p
2
-omplete problem 2-qbf is the set of all
triples hA = fa
1
; :::; a
m
g; B = fb
1
; :::; b
n
g;i where A and B are two disjoint sets of
propositional variables and  is a formula from PROP
A[B
. A positive instane of this
problem is a triple hA;B;i suh that for every A-world !
A
there exists a B-world
!
B
for whih !
A
^ !
B
j= .

p
2
and 
p
2
are omplexity lasses loated at the so-alled seond level of the polynomial
hierarhy, whih plays a prominent role in knowledge representation and reasoning.
3. Formula-Literal and Formula-Variable Independene
Formula-literal and formula-variable independene apture some forms of independene
between the truth values of variables and the possible truth values of a formula. Roughly
speaking,  is dependent on l beause it tells one something positive about l: more preisely,
there is a ontest, i.e., a onjuntion of literals, that, added to to  enables one to infer
l. For instane,  = (a ) b) is dependent on b, sine b an be inferred from  under the
assumption that a is true. Of ourse, we annot assume ontexts that are inonsistent with
, and we annot assume l itself. A formula  will be onsidered as independent from
variable x if and only if it is both independent from x and independent from :x. Dually,
we an interpret both forms of dependene as aboutness relations; when  is dependent on
a literal l, it tells one something about l, and when  is dependent on a variable x, it tells
something about x or about :x.
3.1 Syntatial Independene
The easiest way to dene dependene between a formula  and a literal l is by assuming
that , when put into NNF, ontains l. Reminding that Lit() is the set of literals that
our in the NNF of , this an be formally expressed by the following denition:
Denition 1 (syntatial FL-independene) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
, l a
literal of L
PS
, and L a subset of L
PS
.
  is said to be syntatially Lit-dependent on l (resp. syntatially Lit-independent
from l) if and only if l 2 Lit() (resp. l 62 Lit()).
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  is said to be syntatially Lit-dependent on L if and only if there is a l 2 L suh
that  is syntatially Lit-dependent on l. Otherwise,  is said to be syntatially
Lit-independent from L.
From this denition it follows immediately that  is syntatially Lit-independent from
L if and only if Lit() \ L = ;. Thus, in order to determine whether a formula  is
syntatially Lit-dependent on a set L of literals, it suÆes to hek whether there exists a
literal in L that ours in the NNF of .
Example 2 Let  = :(a ^ b). The NNF of  is (:a _ :b); therefore,  is syntatially
Lit-dependent on both :a and :b, while it is syntatially Lit-independent from a and b.
As this example illustrates, a propositional formula an easily be syntatially Lit-
independent from a literal while syntatially Lit-dependent on its negation. This is as
expeted, sine  may imply l in some ontext, while it may be always impossible to derive
:l. In other words, the set of literals  is syntatially Lit-independent from is not losed
under negation. Interestingly, a notion of syntatial formula-variable independene an be
dened from the more basi notion of syntatial FL-independene.
Denition 2 (syntatial FV-independene) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
, v a
variable of PS, and V a subset of PS.
  is said to be syntatially Var-dependent on v (resp. syntatially Var-independent
from v) if and only if v 2 V ar() (resp. v 62 V ar()).
  is said to be syntatially Var-dependent on V if and only if there is a variable v
in V s.t.  is Var-dependent on it, i.e., if and only if V ar()\ V 6= ;. Otherwise, 
is said to be syntatially Var-independent from V .
Example 3 Let  = (a^:b).  is syntatially Var-dependent on a and on b and synta-
tially Var-independent from .
Syntatial FV-independene an be easily expressed as syntatial FL-independene:
 is syntatially Var-independent from V if and only if it is syntatially Lit-independent
from V [ f:x j x 2 V g. Clearly enough, both syntatial formula-literal independene and
syntatial formula-variable independene an be heked in linear time.
However, these basi forms of independene suer from two important drawbaks. First,
they do not satisfy the priniple of irrelevane of syntax: two equivalent formulas are
not always syntatially independent from the same literals/variables. Seond, syntati-
al dependene does not always apture the intuitive meaning of dependene: for instane,
 = (a ^ :b ^ (a _ b)) is syntatially Lit-dependent on a, :b, b; sine :b an be derived
from ,  is about :b in some sense. Contrastingly, there is no way to derive b from ,
unless produing an inonsisteny.
Handling suh a separation requires a more robust notion of independene, to be intro-
dued in the following setion.
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3.2 Semantial Independene
We now give a semantial denition of independene, whih does not suer from the afore-
mentioned drawbaks, i.e., a denition that does not depend on the syntatial form in
whih formulas are expressed. We will prove that this semantial denition of indepen-
dene does not suer from the seond drawbak of syntax independene, i.e., a formula
that is semantially dependent on a literal always enables one to derive the literal in some
ontext.
Denition 3 ((semantial) FL-independene) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
, l 2
L
PS
, and L a subset of L
PS
.
  is said to be Lit-independent
2
from l, denoted l 67! , if and only if there exists a
formula  s.t.    and  is syntatially Lit-independent from l. Otherwise,  is
said to be Lit-dependent on l, denoted l 7! . The set of all literals of L
PS
suh that
l 7!  is denoted by DepLit().
  is said to be Lit-independent from L, denoted L 67! , if and only if L\DepLit() =
;. Otherwise,  is said to be Lit-dependent on L, denoted L 7! .
Simply rewriting the denition,  is Lit-independent from L if and only if there exists a
formula  s.t.    and  is syntatially Lit-independent from L. Thus, FL-independene
is not aeted by the syntati form in whih a formula is expressed, that is, replaing  with
any of its equivalent formulas does not modify the relation 7!. Sine  is Lit-independent
from L if and only if  an be made syntatially Lit-independent from L while preserving
logial equivalene, it follows that syntatial Lit-independene implies Lit-independene,
but the onverse does not hold in the general ase.
Example 4 Let  = (a ^ :b ^ (a _ b)). We have DepLit() = fa;:bg. Note that  is
Lit-independent from b beause it is equivalent to  = (a ^ :b), in whih b does not appear
positively.
As in the ase of syntatial independene, we an formalize the fat that a formula 
has some eets on the truth value of a variable v. Indeed, we dene a notion of (semantial)
formula-variable independene, whih an also be easily dened from the (semantial) notion
of FL-independene.
Denition 4 ((semantial) FV independene) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
, v 2
PS, and V a subset of PS.
  is said to be Var-independent from v, denoted v 67!
+
 
, if and only if there exists a
formula  s.t.    and  is syntatially Var-independent from v. Otherwise,  is
said to be Var-dependent on v, denoted v 7!
+
 
. We denote by DepV ar() the set
of all variables v suh that v 7!
+
 
.
2. In order to avoid any ambiguity, we will refer to the syntatial forms of independene expliitly from
now on; in other words, independene must be taken as semantial by default in the rest of the paper.
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  is said to be Var-independent from V , denoted V 67!
+
 
, if and only if V \
DepV ar() = ;. Otherwise,  is said to be Var-dependent on V , denoted V 7!
+
 
.
Clearly,  is Var-independent from V if and only if there exists a formula  s.t.   
and  is syntatially Var-independent from V . Moreover, Var-independene is to Lit-
independene as syntatial Var-independene is to syntatial Lit-independene; indeed, 
is Var-independent from V if and only if  is Lit-independent from L
V
.
Example 5 Let  = (a ^ :b ^ (a _ )). We have DepV ar() = fa; bg. Note that  is
Var-independent from .
The denition of semantial FL-independene is based on the set of literals of formulas
equivalent to . Intuitively, this is the easiest way to dene a notion of independene that
is not dependent on the syntax. However, proving theorems diretly from this denition
is not so easy. For instane, we will prove that determining whether a formula  is Lit-
dependent on literal l is in NP, but this result annot be diretly proved from Denition
3, sine heking all possible formulas equivalent to  annot be done with a polynomial
non-deterministi guessing. We give now a semantial haraterization of FL-independene.
Proposition 1 A formula  is Lit-independent from literal l if and only if, for any inter-
pretation ! 2 

PS
, if ! j=  then Fore(!;:l) j= .
As a diret orollary, we get that  is Lit-independent from L if and only if for any
literal l 2 L and any interpretation ! 2 

PS
, if ! j=  then Fore(!;:l) j= .
This property gives an idea of how FL-dependene works. Indeed, if  is Lit-dependent
on a literal l, then there exists an interpretation ! suh that ! j=  and Fore(!;:l) 6j= ,
whih means that (a) ! j= l and (b) the literal l in ! is \really needed" to make ! a model
of , that is, the partial interpretation obtained by removing l in ! does not satisfy .
This property also explains why FL-dependene formalizes the onept of \true in some
ontext", as explained at the beginning of this setion. Indeed,  is Lit-dependent on l if
and only if there is some ontext (onsistent with , and that does not imply l), in whih
 implies l. This an be proved from the above proposition: if ! is an interpretation suh
that ! j=  but Fore(!;:l) 6j= , then the term:
 =
^
(fx 2 PS j ! j=  ^ xg [ f:x j x 2 PS and ! j=  ^ :xg)nflg
is onsistent with  (by onstrution,  is equivalent to the disjuntion of a term equivalent
to ! with a term equivalent to Fore(!;:l)); it also holds that  ^ j= l, while  6j= l, that
is,  is a ontext in whih  implies l.
Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that our notion of Lit-independene oinides with the
notion of (anti-)monotoniity (Ryan, 1991, 1992). To be more preise, a (onsistent) formula
is said to be monotoni (resp. antimonotoni) in variable v if and only if it is Lit-independent
from :v (resp. from v). Interestingly, a sublassial
3
inferene relation, alled natural
inferene, has been dened on this ground (Ryan, 1991, 1992). Basially, a formula '
is onsidered as a onsequene of a formula  if and only if it is a logial onsequene
3. That is, a restrition of lassial entailment j=.
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of it, and  Lit-independene of a literal implies its ' Lit-independene. Aordingly,
natural inferene prevents us from onsidering p _ q as a onsequene of p (it is a relevant
impliation). All our haraterization results about Lit-independene, inluding omplexity
results, have an immediate impat on suh a natural inferene relation (espeially, they
diretly show that the omplexity of natural inferene is in 
p
2
).
Proposition 1 is easily extended to formula-variable independene:
Corollary 1 A formula  is Var-independent from variable v if and only if, for any
interpretation ! 2 

PS
, we have ! j=  if and only if Swith(!; v) j= .
The following metatheoreti properties of FL-independene are used in the rest of this
setion.
Proposition 2
(1) DepLit()  Lit();
(2) If   , then DepLit() = DepLit();
(3a) DepLit( ^ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(3b) DepLit( _ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(4) l 2 DepLit() if and only if :l 2 DepLit(:).
FV-independene exhibits similar properties, plus negation stability (point (4) below),
whih is not satised by FL-independene.
Proposition 3
(1) DepV ar()  V ar();
(2) If   , then DepV ar() = DepV ar();
(3a) DepV ar( ^ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(3b) DepV ar( _ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(4) DepV ar(:) = DepV ar().
Beyond these properties, FL-independene and FV-independene do not exhibit any
partiularly interesting struture. In partiular, FL-independene and FV-independene
neither are monotoni nor anti-monotoni w.r.t. expansion of  (strengthening or weakening
 an easily make it no longer independent from a set of literals or variables).
Reall that L 7!  if and only if L\DepLit() 6= ;. This means that the Lit-dependene
of  on L only implies the Lit-dependene on a literal of L, not a \full" Lit-dependene on
any literal of L. In other words, if we want to hek whether a formula  is Lit-dependent on
any literal of L, we need a notion stronger than FL-dependene, alled full FL-dependene.
The same an be said for FV-dependene.
Denition 5 (full FL/FV-dependene) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
, L be a sub-
set of L
PS
and V be a subset of PS.
  is fully Lit-dependent on L if and only if L  DepLit().
  is fully Var-dependent on V if and only if V  DepV ar().
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Example 6  = (a^:b^(b_:b)) is fully Lit-dependent on fa;:bg and fully Var-dependent
on fa; bg. Contrastingly,  is not fully Lit-dependent on fa; bg.
Clearly enough, whenever  is fully Lit-dependent on L, it is also fully Var-dependent
on V ar(L). However, the onverse does not hold, as the previous example shows.
While full FL-dependene (resp. full FV-dependene) an be heked in linear time
one DepLit() (resp. DepV ar()) is known, at the end of the setion we prove that
determining these sets is NP-hard, and that deiding full FL-dependene (as well as full
FV-dependene) is NP-omplete.
Let us now onsider the partiular ase of full FL-dependene when L = Lit(), or the
full FV-dependene when V = V ar(). If full dependene holds in these ases, we say
that  is Lit-simplied, or Var-simplied, respetively. Var-simpliation is ahieved when
 ontains no ourrene of any variable it is Var-independent from. Lit-simpliation
orresponds to the more restrited situation where the NNF of  does not ontain any
ourrene of a literal it is Lit-independent from.
If a formula  is not Lit-simplied (resp. Var-simplied), then there is some literal (resp.
variable) that ours in the NNF of , but  is not Lit-dependent (resp. Var-dependent) on
it. This means that the syntati form in whih  is expressed ontains a literal or variable
that is indeed useless.
Denition 6 (simplied formula) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
.
  is Lit-simplied if and only if Lit() = DepLit().
  is Var-simplied if and only if V ar() = DepV ar().
As the following example illustrates, every formula that is Lit-simplied also is Var-
simplied but the onverse does not hold in the general ase.
Example 7  = (a^:b^(b_:b)^(a_)) neither is Lit-simplied nor Var-simplied. The
equivalent formula (a ^ :b ^ (b _ :b)) is Var-simplied but it is not Lit-simplied. Finally,
the equivalent formula (a ^ :b) is both Lit-simplied and Var-simplied.
Simplied formulas do not inorporate any useless literals or variables. As the next
proposition shows it, the notion of simplied formula atually is the point where syntatial
independene and (semantial) independene oinide.
Proposition 4 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
.
  is Lit-simplied if and only if the following equivalene holds: for every L  L
PS
,
 is syntatially Lit-independent from L if and only if L 67!  holds.
  is Var-simplied if and only if the following equivalene holds: for every V  PS,
 is syntatially Var-independent from V if and only if V 67!
+
 
 holds.
Thus, while a formula an easily be Lit-independent from a set of literals without be-
ing syntatially Lit-independent from it, simpliation is a way to join Lit-independene
with its syntatial restrition (whih is easier to grasp, and as we will see soon, easier
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to hek in the general ase): Lit-independene and syntatial Lit-independene oinide
on Lit-simplied formulas. The same holds for Var-independene and syntatial Var-
independene.
The strength of the notion of simpliation lies in the fat that every formula an be
simplied preserving its models. This is useful, as simplied formulas an be shorter and
easier to understand than formulas ontaining useless literals.
Proposition 5 For every  from PROP
PS
, there exists a Lit-simplied formula  s.t.
  .
Sine Lit-simplied KBs are also Var-simplied, this proposition also shows that every
KB an be Var-simplied without modifying its set of models.
Interestingly, both FL-independene and FV-independene an be haraterized with-
out onsidering the orresponding syntati notions of independene, just by omparing
formulas obtained by setting the truth value of literals we want to hek the dependene.
Proposition 6 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and l be a literal of L
PS
. The next four
statements are equivalent:
(1) l 67! ;
(2) 
l 1
j= 
l 0
;
(3)  j= 
l 0
;
(4) 
l 1
j= .
The above properties an be used to hek whether a formula is Lit-dependent on a
literal, as the following example shows.
Example 8  = (a ^ :b ^ (b _ :b)) is Lit-independent from b sine replaing b by true
within  gives rise to an inonsistent formula. Contrastingly,  is Lit-dependent on :b
sine replaing b by false within  gives 
b 0
 a, whih is not at least as logially strong
as the inonsistent formula obtained by replaing b by true within .
A similar proposition holds for FV-independene, haraterizing the variables a formula
 depends on, using the formulas 
x 0
and 
x 1
.
Proposition 7 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and x be a variable of PS. The next
four statements are equivalent:
(1) x 67!
+
 
;
(2) 
x 0
 
x 1
;
(3)   
x 0
;
(4)   
x 1
.
As in the ase of literal dependene, the above property an be used to nd out whether
a formula is Var-dependent on a variable.
Example 9  = (a^ (b_:b)) is Var-independent from b sine we have 
b 0
 
b 1
 a.
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Interestingly, FL-independene and FV-independene an be determined in an eÆ-
ient way when  is given in some spei normal forms, namely, prime impliate nor-
mal form or prime impliant normal form. For suh normal forms, Lit-independene and
Var-independene ome down to their orresponding syntatial forms.
Proposition 8 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L be a subset of L
PS
. The next
statements are equivalent:
(1) L 67! ;
(2) PI()  f j  is a term that does not ontain any literal from Lg;
(3) IP ()  fÆ j Æ is a lause that does not ontain any literal from Lg.
Proposition 9 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V be a subset of PS. The next
statements are equivalent:
(1) V 67!
+
 
;
(2) PI()  f j  is a term that does not ontain any variable from V g;
(3) IP ()  fÆ j Æ is a lause that does not ontain any variable from V g.
Example 10 Let  = (a^:b^(b_:b)). We have PI() = f(a^:b)g and IP () = fa;:bg
(up to logial equivalene). We an easily observe that  is Lit-independent from b looking
at PI() (or IP ()). We an also easily state that  is Lit-dependent on :b and Var-
independent from  by onsidering any of these normal forms.
Proposition 7 shows that a KB an be easily Var-simplied (i.e., in polynomial time)
as soon as the variables it is Var-independent from have been determined. Indeed, we an
easily design a greedy algorithm for simplifying KBs. This algorithm onsists in onsidering
every variable x of V ar() in a suessive way, while replaing  by 
x 0
whenever  is
Var-independent from x. This algorithm runs in time polynomial in the size of  one the
variables  is Var-independent from have been omputed. At the end, the resulting KB is
Var-simplied.
Lit-simplifying a KB is not so easy if no assumptions are made about its syntax, due
to the fat that literals signs are ruial here. Indeed, looking only at the ourrene of a
variable inside a formula is not suÆient to state whether or not this is a positive ourrene
(or a negative one). Fortunately, turning a formula into its NNF is omputationally easy (as
long as it does not ontain any ourrene of onnetives like, or ) and it proves suÆient
to design a greedy algorithm for Lit-simplifying a KB when the literals it is Lit-independent
from have been identied. Indeed, within an NNF formula, every literal an be onsidered
easily as an atomi objet. This algorithm onsists in onsidering every literal l of Lit()
in a suessive way, while replaing every ourrene of l in  by false onsidering every
literal of Lit() as an atom. Stated otherwise, when l is a positive (resp. negative) literal
x (resp. :x), replaing l by false does not mean replaing :x (resp. x) by true: only the
ourrenes of l with the right sign are onsidered. This algorithm runs in time polynomial
in the size of  one the literals  is Lit-independent from have been omputed. At the
end, the resulting KB is Lit-simplied.
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3.3 Complexity Results
While syntatial FL and FV-dependene an be easily heked in linear time in the
size of the input, this is far from being expeted for (semantial) FL-dependene and FV-
dependene in the general ase:
Proposition 10 (omplexity of FL/FV-dependene) FL dependene, FV depen-
dene, full FL dependene and full FV dependene are NP-omplete.
Thus, although they look simple, the problems of determining whether a formula is
independent from a literal or a variable are as hard as heking propositional entailment.
Interestingly, the omplexity of both deision problems fall down to P whenever heking
(in)dependene beomes tratable. Apart from the ase of syntatial independene, some
other restritions on  makes (in)dependene testable in polynomial time. Espeially, we
get:
Proposition 11 Whenever  belongs to a lass C of CNF formulas that is tratable for
lausal query answering (i.e., there exists a polytime algorithm to determine whether  j= 
for any CNF formula ) and stable for variable instantiation (i.e., replaing in  2 C any
variable by true or by false gives a formula that still belongs to C) then FL dependene,
FV dependene, full FL dependene and full FV dependene are in P.
In partiular, when  is restrited to a renamable Horn CNF formula or to binary
lauses (Krom formula), all four deision problems above belong to P.
We have also investigated the omplexity of heking whether a formula is Lit-simplied
(and Var-simplied):
Proposition 12 Lit-simplified formula and Var-simplified formula are NP-omplete.
All these omplexity results have some impat on the approahes that expliitly need
omputing DepV ar() as a preproessing task. Namely, we have the following result:
Proposition 13
1. Determining whether DepLit() = L (where L is a set of literals), and determining
whether DepV ar() = X (where X is a set of variables) is BH
2
-omplete.
2. The searh problem onsisting in omputing DepLit() (respetively DepV ar()) is
in F
p
2
and is both NP-hard and oNP-hard.
3.4 Disussion
The previous haraterizations and omplexity results lead to several questions: when is
it worthwhile to preproess a knowledge base by omputing independene relations? How
should these independene relations be omputed? What is the level of generality of the
denitions and results we gave in this setion?
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Many equivalent haraterizations of formula-variable independene have been given in
the literature, eah of whih ould serve as a denition (Denition 4, Corollary 1, eah of the
statements (2), (3) and (4) in Proposition 7 and of the statements (2), (3) in Proposition 9),
so one may wonder whih one has to be used in pratie.
In many papers referring expliitly to formula-variable independene, the prime impli-
ant/ate haraterization (Proposition 9) is used as a denition (Boutilier, 1994; Doherty
et al., 1998). Generally speaking, this is not the heapest way to ompute the set of vari-
ables a formula depends on, sine the size of PI() is exponential in the size of  in the
worst ase. This haraterization is to be used in pratie only if the syntatial form of
 is suh that its prime impliants or prime impliates an be omputed easily from it
(this is the ase for instane whenever  is a Krom formula). Clearly, the heapest way to
ompute formula-variable independene onsists in using any of the equivalent formulations
of Proposition 7, whih all onsist of validity tests.
Cheking whether a formula  is Var-independent from a variable x is oNP-omplete,
whih implies that simplifying a knowledge base by getting rid of redundant variables needs
jV ar()j alls to an NP orale, and is thus in F
p
2
and not below (unless NP = oNP). This
may look paradoxial (and sometimes useless) to preliminarily ompute several instanes
of a NP or oNP-hard independene problem to help solving a (single) instane of a NP
or oNP-omplete problem. However, this negative omment has a general sope only,
and in many partiular ases, this an prove quite eÆient (indeed, even when  has no
partiular syntatial form, the satisability or the unsatisability of 
x 0
^ :
x 1
may
be partiularly easy to hek). Furthermore, if the knowledge base  is to be queried many
times, then the preproessing phase onsisting in Var-simplifying  by ignoring useless
variables is likely to be worthwhile.
4. Forgetting
In this setion, we dene what forgetting is, present some of its properties, and nally give
some omplexity results.
4.1 Denitions and Properties
A basi way to simplify a KB w.r.t. a set of literals or a set of variables onsists in forgetting
literals/variables in it. Beyond the simpliation task, forgetting is a way to make a formula
independent from literals/variables. Let us rst start with literal forgetting:
Denition 7 (literal forgetting) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L be a subset
of L
PS
. ForgetLit(; L) is the formula indutively dened as follows:
1. ForgetLit(; ;) = ,
2. ForgetLit(; flg) = 
l 1
_ (:l ^ ),
3. ForgetLit(; flg [ L) = ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; L); flg).
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This denition is sound sine the ordering in whih literals of L are onsidered does
not matter
4
. We an also prove that the denition above is equivalent to the one in whih
Point 2. is replaed by
ForgetLit(; flg) = 
l 1
_ (:l ^ 
l 0
)
just beause  and 
l 0
are equivalent modulo :l.
Let us now give a semantial haraterization of literal forgetting. If L = flg, that is, L
is omposed of a single literal, then forgetting l from a formula  amounts to introduing
the model Fore(!;:l) for eah model ! of  suh that ! j= l.
Proposition 14 The set of models of ForgetLit(; flg) an be expressed as:
Mod(ForgetLit(; flg)) = Mod() [ fFore(!;:l) j ! j= g
= f! j Fore(!; l) j= g
A similar statement an be given for the ase in whih L is omposed of more than one
literal. In this ase, for eah model ! of , we an fore any subset of literals L
1
 L suh
that ! j= L
1
to assume the value false.
Proposition 15 The set of models of ForgetLit(; L) an be expressed as:
Mod(ForgetLit(; L)) = f! j Fore(!;L
1
) j=  where L
1
 Lg
As a orollary, we obtain the following properties of literal forgetting:
Corollary 2 Let ,  be formulas from PROP
PS
and L
1
; L
2
 L
PS
.
  j= ForgetLit(; L
1
) holds.
 If  j=  holds, then ForgetLit(; L
1
) j= ForgetLit(; L
1
) holds as well.
 If L
1
 L
2
holds, then ForgetLit(; L
1
) j= ForgetLit(; L
2
) holds as well.
Let now onsider an example.
Example 11 Let  = (:a _ b) ^ (a _ ). We have ForgetLit(; f:ag)  (a _ ) ^ (b _ ).
The key proposition for the notion of forgetting is the following one:
4. The proof of this statement is almost straightforward: let l
1
, l
2
be two literals;
1. if l
1
6= l
2
and l
1
6= :l
2
then ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; l
1
); l
2
) = 
l
1
 1;l
2
 1
_ (:l
1
^ )
l
2
 1
_ (:l
2
^

l
1
 1
)_ (:l
1
^:l
2
^)  
l
1
 1;l
2
 1
_ (:l
1
^
l
2
 1
)_ (:l
2
^
l
1
 1
)_ (:l
1
^:l
2
^) is symmetri
in l
1
and l
2
;
2. if l
2
= :l
1
= :l then ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; l);:l) = (
l 1
_ (:l ^ 
l 0
))
l 0
_ (l ^ (
l 1
_ (:l ^

l 0
))
l 0
)  
l 1
_ 
l 0
is symmetri in l and :l;
3. the ase l
1
= l
2
is trivial.
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Proposition 16 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
. ForgetLit(; L) is the
logially strongest onsequene of  that is Lit-independent from L (up to logial equiva-
lene).
The following immediate onsequene of Proposition 16 establishes strong relationships
between literal forgetting and Lit-independene:
Corollary 3 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.  is Lit-independent from
L if and only if   ForgetLit(; L) holds.
The following one gives an immediate appliation of literal forgetting:
Corollary 4 If a formula ' is Lit-independent from L, then  j= ' holds if and only if
ForgetLit(; L) j= '.
This result proves that forgetting literals from L does not aet entailment of formulas
that are Lit-independent from L. This is in some sense analogous to the onept of ltration
in modal logis (Goldblatt, 1987); indeed, if we are interested in knowing whether  j= '
only for formulas ' that are Lit-independent from L, then the literals of L an be forgotten
in .
Let us now investigate the omputation of ForgetLit(; L). Let us rst onsider DNF
formulas . Forgetting literals within DNF formulas is a omputationally easy task. On the
one hand, forgetting literals within a disjuntive formula omes down to forgetting them in
every disjunt:
Proposition 17 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.
ForgetLit( _ ; L)  ForgetLit(; L) _ ForgetLit(; L):
On the other hand, forgetting literals within a onsistent term simply onsists in remov-
ing them from the term:
Proposition 18 Let  be a onsistent term from PROP
PS
(viewed as the set of its literals)
and L  L
PS
. ForgetLit(; L) 
V
l2nL
l.
Combining the two previous propositions shows how literals an be forgotten from a
DNF formula  in polynomial time. It is suÆient to delete every literal of L from eah
disjunt of  (if one of the disjunts beomes empty then ForgetLit(; L)  true).
Things are more ompliated for onjuntive formulas ^. Espeially, there is no result
similar to Proposition 17 for onjuntive formulas. While ForgetLit(; L)^ForgetLit(; L)
is a logial onsequene of ForgetLit(^; L) (see Corollary 2), the onverse does not hold
in the general ase.
Example 12 Let  = a,  = :a, and L = fag. Sine a 67! , we have ForgetLit(; L) 
. Sine ForgetLit(; L) is valid, we have (ForgetLit(; L) ^ ForgetLit(; L))  :a.
Sine  ^  is inonsistent, ForgetLit( ^ ; L) is inonsistent as well.
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Clearly enough, any non-valid lause Æ is Lit-independent from L if and only if Lit(Æ)\
L = ;. Sine the onjuntion of two formulas that are Lit-independent from L is Lit-
independent from L (see Proposition 2), and sine every formula is equivalent to a CNF
formula, Proposition 16 shows ForgetLit(; L) equivalent to the set of all lauses Æ that are
entailed by  and are from fÆ lause j Lit(Æ)\L = ;g. Beause fÆ lause j Lit(Æ)\L = ;g is
losed under subsumption (i.e., it is a stable prodution eld), it is possible to take advantage
of onsequene nding algorithms (see Marquis, 2000), to derive a CNF representation
of ForgetLit(; L). Espeially, in the ase where  is a CNF formula, resolution-based
onsequene nding algorithms like those reported in (Inoue, 1992) or (del Val, 1999) an
be used; this is not very surprising sine resolution is nothing but variable elimination.
In ontrast to the disjuntive formulas situation, there is no guarantee that suh onsequene-
nding algorithms run in time polynomial in the input size when the input is a onjuntive
formula (otherwise, as explained in the following, we would have P = NP). Nevertheless,
forgetting literals within a onjuntive formula  an be easy in some restrited ases, es-
peially when  is given by the set of its prime impliates; in this situation, it is suÆient
to give up those lauses ontaining a literal from L.
Proposition 19 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.
IP (ForgetLit(; L)) = fÆ j Æ 2 IP () and Lit(Æ) \ L = ;g:
The notion of literal forgetting generalizes the notion of variable elimination from propo-
sitional logi (that was already known by Boole as elimination of middle terms and has been
generalized to the rst-order ase in a more reent past by Lin & Reiter, 1994). Indeed,
variable elimination is about variable forgetting, i.e., the one ahieved not onsidering the
literals signs:
Denition 8 (variable forgetting) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and let V be a
subset of PS. ForgetV ar(; V ) is the formula indutively dened as follows:
 ForgetV ar(; ;) = ,
 ForgetV ar(; fxg) = 
x 1
_ 
x 0
,
 ForgetV ar(; fxg [ V ) = ForgetV ar(ForgetV ar(; V ); fxg).
Example 13 Let  = (:a _ b) ^ (a _ ). We have ForgetV ar(; fag)  (b _ ).
As a diret onsequene of the denition, ForgetV ar(; fx
1
; :::; x
n
g) is equivalent to the
quantied boolean formula (usually with free variables!) denoted 9x
1
: : : 9x
n
.
Clearly enough, forgetting a variable x amounts to forgetting both the literals x and
:x.
Proposition 20 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V  PS. We have
ForgetV ar(; V )  ForgetLit(; L
V
)
This result, together with the previous results on literal forgetting, gives us the following
orollaries for variable forgetting:
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Corollary 5
Mod(ForgetV ar(; fxg)) = Mod() [ fSwith(!; x) j ! j= g:
Corollary 6 Let  be a formula and V  PS. ForgetV ar(; V ) is the logially strongest
onsequene of  that is Var-independent from V (up to logial equivalene).
Corollary 7 If a formula ' is Var-independent from V , then  j= ' if and only if
ForgetV ar(; V ) j= '.
A onsequene of the latter result is that forgetting variables is useful when only a subset
of variables are really used in the queries. Thus, if  represents some piees of knowledge
about a senario of interest, and we are interested in knowing whether a fat ' is true in the
senario, the logial operation to do is to query whether  j= '. Now, if the possible fats '
we are interested in do not involve some variables V , then these variables an be forgotten
from , as querying whether ' is implied an be done on ForgetV ar(; V ) instead of .
Through the previous proposition, some algorithms for forgetting variables an be easily
derived from algorithms for forgetting literals (some of them have been skethed before).
Speially, polynomial time algorithms for forgetting variables within a DNF formula or a
formula given by the set of its prime impliates an be obtained. Other tratable lasses of
propositional formulas for variable forgetting exist. For instane, taking advantage of the
fat that ForgetV ar(^; V )  ForgetV ar(; V )^ForgetV ar(; V ) whenever V ar()\
V ar() = ; holds, Darwihe (1999) showed that variable forgetting in a formula  an
be done in linear time as soon as  is in Deomposable Negation Normal Form (DNNF),
i.e., a (DAG)NNF formula in whih the onjunts of any onjuntive subformula do not
share any variable. Interestingly, the DNNF fragment of propositional logi is stritly more
suint than the DNF one (espeially, some DNNF formulas only admit exponentially-large
equivalent DNF formulas) (Darwihe & Marquis, 1999).
In the general ase, just as for the literal situation, there is no way to forget eÆiently
(i.e., in polynomial time) a set of variables within a formula (unless P = NP). Nevertheless,
the following deomposition property an be helpful in some situations (atually, it is heavily
exploited in Kohlas et al., 1999).
Proposition 21 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
, and V be a subset of PS. If
V 67!
+
 
, then ForgetV ar( ^ ; V )   ^ ForgetV ar(; V ).
Note that the orresponding property for literal forgetting does not hold (as a previous
example shows).
Forgetting literals or variables proves helpful in various settings (we already skethed
some of them in the introdution). For instane, minimal model inferene (or irum-
sription MCarthy, 1986) an be expressed using literal forgetting (but not diretly using
variable forgetting, whih shows the interest of the more general form we introdued). In-
deed, it is well-known that losed world inferene from a knowledge base  an be logially
haraterized as lassial entailment from  ompleted with some assumptions. In the
irumsription framework (MCarthy, 1986), given a partition hP;Q;Zi of PS, suh as-
sumptions are the negations of the formulas  s.t.  does not ontain any variable from
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Z and for every lause  ontaining only positive literals built up from P and literals built
up from Q, if  6j=  holds, then  6j=  _  holds as well. Equivalently, : is onsidered a
reasonable assumption whenever it is (syntatially) Var-independent from Z and expand-
ing  with it does not modify what is already known about L
+
P
[ L
Q
. Clearly enough, the
signs of literals from L
P
really matter here. Using our previous notations, : is assumed
if and only if Z 67!
+
 
: and  
L
+
P
[L
Q
 ^ :. As a onsequene, we derive the following
haraterization of irumsription:
Proposition 22 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
, and P , Q, Z be three disjoint
sets of variables from PS (suh that V ar() [ V ar()  P [Q [ Z). It holds:
 If  does not ontain any variable from Z
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= 
if and only if
 j= ForgetLit( ^; L
 
P
[ L
Z
)
 In the general ase:
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= 
if and only if
 j= ForgetLit( ^ :ForgetLit( ^ :; L
Z
[ L
 
P
); L
Z
[ L
 
P
)
where CIRC is irumsription as dened in (MCarthy, 1986).
Similar haraterizations an be derived for the other forms of losed world reasoning
pointed out so far.
Forgetting also is a entral onept when we are onerned with query answering w.r.t.
a restrited target language. Indeed, in many problems, there is a set of variables for whih
we are not interested in their truth value (so we an forget them). For instane, in the
SATPLAN framework by Kautz, MAllester, and Selman (1996), ompiling away uents or
ations amounts to forgetting variables. Sine the only variables we are really interested in
within a given set of lauses representing a planning problem instane are those representing
the plans, we an ompile away any other variable, if this does not introdue an inrease
of size of the resulting formula. Another situation where suh a forgetting naturally ours
is model-based diagnosis (Reiter, 1987); ompiling away every variable exept the abnor-
mality ones does not remove any piee of information required to ompute the onits
and the diagnoses of a system. Thus, Darwihe (1998) shows how both the set of onits
and the set of onsisteny-based diagnoses of a system is haraterized by the formula ob-
tained by forgetting every variable exept the abnormality ones in the onjuntion of the
system desription and the available observations. Provided that the system desription
has rst been turned into DNNF, forgetting an be ahieved in linear time and diagnoses
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ontaining a minimal number of faulty omponents an be enumerated in (output) poly-
nomial time. Interestingly, this work shows that the diagnosis task does not require the
(usually expensive) omputation of prime impliates/impliants to be ahieved (atually,
omputing prime impliates/impliants is just a way to ahieve variable forgetting and not
a goal in onsisteny-based diagnosis). Forgetting every variable from a formula allows for
onsisteny heking sine  is onsistent if and only if ForgetV ar(; V ar()) is onsistent.
The well-known Davis and Putnam algorithm for satisability testing (Davis & Putnam,
1960) (reently revisited by Dehter and Rish (1994)under the name diretional resolution)
basially onsists in omputing a lausal representation of ForgetV ar(; V ar()) from a
CNF  using resolution; if the empty lause is not generated, then  is onsistent and the
onverse also holds.
Forgetting an also be used as a key onept in order to organize knowledge so as
to replae one global inferene into a number of loal inferenes as shown (among oth-
ers) by Kohlas et al. (1999) and Amir and MIlraith (2000), MIlraith and Amir (2001).
Loosely speaking, suh approahes rely on the idea that exploiting all the piees of infor-
mation given in a knowledge base is typially not required for query answering. Fousing
on what is relevant to the query is suÆient. While suh tehniques do not lower the
omplexity of inferene from the theoretial side, they an lead to signiant pratial
improvements. For instane, assume that  onsists of three formulas 
1
, 
2
, and 
3
.
For any query 	, let V
	
= (
S
3
i=1
V ar(
i
)) n V ar(	). We have  j= 	 if and only if
ForgetV ar(
V
3
i=1

i
; V
	
) j= 	. If V ar(
3
)\ (
S
2
i=1
V ar(
i
)) = ;, this amounts to test inde-
pendently whether ForgetV ar(
V
2
i=1

i
; V
	
) j= 	 holds or ForgetV ar(
3
; V
	
) j= 	 holds.
This way, one global inferene is replaed by two loal inferenes. Now, ForgetV ar(
1
^

2
; V
	
) is equivalent to ForgetV ar(
1
^ ForgetV ar(
2
; V
	
\ (V ar(
2
) n V ar(
1
))); V
	
).
Aordingly, every variable from 
2
that is not a variable of 
1
or a variable of 	 an be
forgotten rst within 
2
beause it gives no information relevant to the query; thus, only a
few piees of knowledge have to be \propagated" from 
2
to 
1
before answering the query,
and forgetting allows for haraterizing them exatly.
As evoked in the introdution, another senario in whih forgetting is useful is that of
belief update. Indeed, there are many formalizations of belief update that are based on a
form of variable forgetting. The basi senario is the following one: we have a formula 
that represents our knowledge; there are some hanges in the world, and what we know is
that after them a formula ' beomes true. The simplest way to deal with the update is
to assume that ' represents all we know about the truth value of the variables in '. As a
result, we have to \forget" from  the value of the variables in V ar('). There are dierent
formalizations of this shema, based on whether formula ' is onsidered to arry information
about variables it mentions (Winslett, 1990) or only on the variables it depends on (Hegner,
1987), or also on variables related to dependent variables via a dependene funtion (Herzig,
1996). This kind of update shema, while less known than the Possible Models Approah by
Winslett (1990), has proved to be suited for reasoning about ations (Doherty et al., 1998;
Herzig & Ri, 1999). Furthermore, the possibility to forget literals (and not variables) is
also valuable in this framework to take aount for persistent information, as shown reently
by some of us (Herzig et al., 2001), sine the polarity of information is often signiant.
For instane, while forgetting the uent alive from a knowledge base is not problemati,
forgetting the persistent uent :alive would surely be inadequate.
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Forgetting an also be used to haraterize a dependene relation alled denability
(Lang & Marquis, 1998b) as well as the strongest neessary (resp. weakest suÆient)
onditions of a propositional variable on a set V of variables given a theory  (Lin, 2000;
Doherty, Lukaszewiz, & Szalas, 2001). As shown in (Lang & Marquis, 1998b; Lin, 2000;
Doherty et al., 2001), all these notions have many appliations in various AI elds, inluding
hypothesis disrimination, agent ommuniation, theory approximation and abdution.
Finally, based on literal and variable forgetting, valuable equivalene relations over for-
mulas an also be dened:
Denition 9 (Lit-equivalene, Var-equivalene) Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
,
L be a subset of L
PS
, and V be a subset of PS.
  and  are said to be Lit-equivalent given L, denoted  
L
, if and only if
ForgetLit(; Lit() n L)  ForgetLit(; Lit() n L).
  and  are said to be Var-equivalent given V , denoted  
V
, if and only if
ForgetV ar(; V ar() n V )  ForgetV ar(; V ar() n V ).
Example 14 Let  = (a ) b) ^ (b ) ) and  = (a ) d) ^ (d ) ). Let L = f:a; g. 
and  are Lit-equivalent given L.
Suh equivalene relations apture some forms of dependene between formulas. They
are useful in the various situations where it is required to formally haraterize the fat that
two knowledge bases share some theorems. Thus, two formulas are Lit-equivalent given L
whenever every lause ontaining literals from L only is a logial onsequene of the rst
formula if and only if it is a logial onsequene of the seond formula. In the same vein,
two Var-equivalent formulas given V have the same lausal onsequenes built up from V .
Clearly, Lit-equivalene is more ne-grained than Var-equivalene in the sense that two
formulas Var-equivalent given V are also Lit-equivalent given L = L
V
, the set of literals
built upon V , but the onverse does not hold in the general ase. Some appliations are
related to knowledge approximation ( is a orret approximation of  over L if and only
if  and  are Lit-equivalent given L), normalization (turning a formula  into a CNF 
by introduing new symbols is aeptable as long as the two formulas are equivalent over
the original language, i.e.,  and  are Var-equivalent given V = V ar()), and so on.
4.2 Complexity Results
It is quite easy to prove that forgetting is a omputationally expensive operation in the
general ase. Indeed, sine a formula  is onsistent if and only if ForgetLit(; Lit())
is onsistent and sine the latter formula is Lit-independent from every literal (i.e., it is
equivalent to true or equivalent to false), there is no way to ompute a formula  equivalent
to ForgetLit(; L) in polynomial time, unless P = NP. Atually, we an derive the more
onstraining result, showing that the size of any formula equivalent to ForgetLit(; L) may
be superpolynomially larger than the size of .
Proposition 23 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and let L be a nite subset of L
PS
.
In the general ase, there is no propositional formula  equivalent to ForgetLit(; L) s.t.
414
Propositional Independene
the size of  is polynomially bounded in jj + jLj, unless NP \ oNP  P/poly (whih is
onsidered unlikely in omplexity theory).
This result shows that omputing an expliit representation of ForgetLit(; L) under
the form of a propositional formula is hard, even in a ompilation-based approah where
the time needed to derive suh a formula is negleted.
Finally, we have also derived:
Proposition 24 (omplexity of Lit/Var-equivalene)
Lit-equivalene and Var-equivalene are 
p
2
-omplete.
5. Inueneability, Relevane, and Strit Relevane
In this setion, we show that several notions of dependene introdued in the literature are
equivalent to, or an be expressed in terms of, semantial independene. In partiular, we
show that Boutilier's denition of inueneability (Boutilier, 1994) is in fat equivalent to
(semantial) FV-dependene. The denition of relevane as given by Lakemeyer (1997) an
also be proved to be equivalent to FV-dependene. One of the two denitions given by Lake-
meyer (1997) for strit relevane an also be expressed in terms of FV-dependene. These
results allow for nding the omplexity of all these forms of dependene as a diret orollary
to the omplexity results reported in the previous setion. For the sake of ompleteness,
we also give the omplexity of the original denition of strit relevane (Lakemeyer, 1995)
(whih is not diretly related to FV-dependene), whih turns out to be omputationally
simpler than the subsequent denition given by Lakemeyer (1997).
5.1 Inueneability
Boutilier (1994) introdues a notion of inueneability. Roughly speaking, a formula  is
inueneable from a set of variables V if there exists a senario in whih the truth value of
 depends on the value of the variables in V . This idea an be formalized as follows.
Denition 10 (inueneability) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of
PS.  is inueneable from V if and only if there exists a PS n V -world !, and two
V -worlds !
1
and !
2
s.t. ! ^ !
1
j=  and ! ^ !
2
j= : hold.
In other words, there is a senario ! in whih the formula  an be true or false,
depending on the value of the variables in V . While inueneability looks dierent from
the denitions given in this paper, it an be shown that in fat inueneability oinides
with FV-dependene.
Proposition 25 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is inu-
eneable from V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V .
As a onsequene, a model-theoreti haraterization of inueneability an be easily
derived from the one for FV-independene. The omplexity of inueneability is an easy
orollary to this property: influeneability is NP-omplete.
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5.2 Relevane
Lakemeyer (1995, 1997) introdues several forms of relevane. We show how these forms of
relevane are strongly related to FV-independene. We also omplete the results given in
(Lakemeyer, 1997), by exhibiting the omputational omplexity of eah form of relevane
introdued in (Lakemeyer, 1997).
5.2.1 Relevane of a formula to a subjet matter
Lakemeyer's notion of relevane of a formula to a subjet matter an be dened in terms of
prime impliates of the formula, as follows (see Denition 9 in Lakemeyer, 1997):
Denition 11 (relevane to a subjet matter) Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and
V a subset of PS.  is relevant to V if and only if there exists a prime impliate of 
mentioning a variable from V .
Example 15 Let  = (a ^ ) and V = fa; bg.  is relevant to V .
As a onsequene, Lakemeyer's notion of irrelevane of a formula to a subjet matter
oinides with FV-independene.
Proposition 26 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is relevant
to V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V .
Thus, the model-theoreti haraterization of FV-independene also applies to irrele-
vane of a formula to a subjet matter. We also have that the irrelevane of a formula to
a subjet matter oinides with Boutilier's denition of inueneability. Finally, the above
proposition allows for an easy proof of omplexity for relevane, namely, relevane of a
formula to a subjet matter is NP-omplete.
5.2.2 Strit relevane of a formula to a subjet matter
Lakemeyer has introdued two forms of strit relevane. The (hronologially) rst one has
been given in (Lakemeyer, 1995), as follows.
Denition 12 (strit relevane to a subjet matter, Lakemeyer, 1995) Let  be a
formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is stritly relevant to V if and only if
every prime impliate of  ontains a variable from V .
Lakemeyer has also introdued another notion of strit relevane (Lakemeyer, 1997),
more demanding than the original one. Here we onsider an equivalent denition.
Denition 13 (strit relevane to a subjet matter, Lakemeyer, 1997) Let  be a
formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is stritly relevant to V if and only if
there exists a prime impliate of  mentioning a variable from V , and every prime impliate
of  mentions only variables from V .
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Both denitions prevent tautologies and ontraditory formulas from being stritly rele-
vant to any set of variables. The basi dierene between these two denitions is that in the
rst one we want that every prime impliate of  ontains at least a variable from V , while
in the seond ase we impose that every prime impliate of  must ontain only variables
from V
5
. As the following example shows, there are formulas for whih the two denitions
of strit relevane do not oinide.
Example 16 Let  = (a _ b) and V = fag. There is only one prime impliate of ,
namely a_ b. Sine it ontains at least a variable of V , it follows that  is stritly relevant
to V w.r.t. (Lakemeyer, 1995). However, sine the prime impliate a _ b is not omposed
only of variables of V (beause b 62 V ), it follows that  is not stritly relevant to V w.r.t.
(Lakemeyer, 1997).
Through FV-independene, we an derive an alternative haraterization of the notion of
strit relevane introdued by Lakemeyer (1997). Indeed, as a straightforward onsequene
of the denition, we have:
Proposition 27 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is stritly
relevant to V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V and Var-independent from V ar()nV .
We have identied the omplexity of both denitions of strit relevane, and they turn
out to be dierent: the rst denition is harder than the seond one.
Proposition 28 (omplexity of strit relevane)
(1) strit relevane of a formula to a subjet matter (Lakemeyer, 1995) is

p
2
-omplete.
(2) strit relevane of a formula to a subjet matter (Lakemeyer, 1997) is
BH
2
-omplete.
These omplexity results improve Theorem 50 from (Lakemeyer, 1997), whih only
points out the NP-hardness of irrelevane and strit irrelevane as dened in (Lakemeyer,
1997).
6. Other Related Work and Further Extensions
In this setion, we rst disuss other related work, then some possible extensions of the
notions and results we have presented before.
6.1 Other Related Work
As already evoked, independene has been onsidered under various forms in various AI
elds.
5. Strit relevane as in (Lakemeyer, 1997) ould also be shown to be strongly related to ontrollability
(Boutilier, 1994; Lang & Marquis, 1998b).
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6.1.1 Independene in propositional logi
There are other forms of independene in propositional logi that we have not onsidered
in this artile, espeially, denability, ontrollability (Lang & Marquis, 1998b) as well as
onditional independene (Darwihe, 1997). IfX, Y and Z are three disjoint sets of variables
and  is a knowledge base then X and Y are onditionally independent w.r.t. Z knowing
 if and only if for any Z-world !
Z
, one we know !
Z
(and ), learning something about
X annot make us learn anything new about Y (and vie versa). The omputational
issues pertaining to onditional independene and to stronger notions as well as related
notions suh as relevane between subjet matters (Lakemeyer, 1997) and novelty (Greiner
& Genesereth, 1983), have been extensively studied in a ompanion paper (Lang, Liberatore,
& Marquis, 2002).
6.1.2 Impliit and expliit dependene
Several approahes to belief hange make use of a expliit dependene relation, whih means
that it is part of the input (while ours is impliit, i.e., derived from the input). Thus, om-
puting independene relations from a knowledge base an be seen as an upstream task
enabling us to speify the \ore" (minimal) independene relation upon whih the belief
hange operator is based; this ore independene relation an then be ompleted by spe-
ifying expliitly some additional dependenies using knowledge about the domain. Suh
an approah has been proposed for belief revision in (Fari~nas del Cerro & Herzig, 1996),
for belief update in (Marquis, 1994) and (Herzig, 1996) and for reasoning about ation in
(Herzig & Ri, 1999).
6.1.3 Independene and ontexts
Contextual reasoning (Ghidini & Giunhiglia, 2001) has been introdued for formalizing
domains in whih knowledge an naturally be divided into parts (ontexts). Eah ontext is
haraterized by its own language and alphabet. The knowledge base of a ontext ontains
what is relevant to a part of the domain. However, it is not guaranteed that the dierent
parts of the domain do not interat, so inferene in one ontext may be aeted by the
knowledge of some other ontext.
The main dierene between ontextual reasoning and independene is that the lat-
ter is a study of the relevane relation that an be drawn from a \at" (i.e., not divided
into ontexts) knowledge base; whereas ontextual reasoning is on knowledge about spei
ontexts, that is, knowledge is expressed by speifying whih ontext it refers to. In other
words, the relevane relation is a result of reasoning about knowledge in studying depen-
deny; on the other hand, it is one of the data that has to be provided for reasoning about
ontexts.
6.1.4 The definition of irrelevane by Levy et al.
The denition of irrelevane given by Levy, Fikes, and Sagiv (1997) aims at establishing
whih fats of a knowledge base are irrelevant to the derivation of a query. In partiular,
they onsider a rst-order logi with no funtion symbols and a set of inferene rules. A
knowledge base is a set of losed formulas (formulas with no free variables). Derivation of a
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query (another losed formula) is obtained by applying the inferene rules to the knowledge
base and the logial axioms of the theory.
A formula  of the knowledge base is irrelevant to the derivation of another formula
 if  does not \partiipate" to the proess of inferring  from the knowledge base. For
example, in the knowledge base fA(1); C(2); A(X) ) B(X)g, it is lear that A(1) is relevant
to B(1), while C(2) is not.
This denition beomes ompliated when more omplex senarios are onsidered. Namely,
Levy et al. onsider three dierent \oordinates": rst, whether all derivations are onsid-
ered or just one; seond, whether we onsider all derivations or just minimal ones; third,
whether we onsider membership to the proof or just derivability from the formulas that
ompose the proof (in this ase, we have four possible hoies).
Besides the fat that this notion of irrelevane is based on rst-order logi, there are
other, more substantial, dierenes between it and the ideas investigated in this paper.
First, it is a relation between two formulas, given a bakground knowledge base. As suh,
it is more related to other notions of relevane in the literature (Lang & Marquis, 1998a).
Seond, it is based on the onept of proof, whih is something not ompletely dependent on
the semantis. For example, replaing the usual modus ponens with the strange inferene
rule ; ;  )  ! , whih does not hange the semantis of the logis, then the formula
C(2) of the knowledge base above beomes magially relevant to B(1). This is perfetly
reasonable in the approah by Levy et al., where improving eÆieny using a spei proof
theory is the aim.
6.2 Extending our Notions and Results
The notions and results presented in this paper an be extended in several diretions.
6.2.1 Numerial and ordinal notions of formula-variable independene;
forgetting in more general strutures
It may be worth wondering about how the notions of FL-independene and FV-independene
an be generalized to the ase where the knowledge base is not a mere propositional for-
mula but a probability distribution over 

PS
, or an inomplete probability (or equivalently
a set of probability distributions), or a stratied knowledge base, or any other ordinal or
numerial struture.
First, let us notie that some of our haraterizations lead to quite intuitive and general
ideas. To take the ase of FV-independene, we have shown that the following three state-
ments are equivalent when  is a propositional knowledge base:
(a)  does not tell anything about x, in any ontext;
(b)  an be rewritten equivalently in a formula 
0
in whih x does not appear
(Denition 4);
() for any two interpretations ! and !
0
that dier only in the value given to x, the status
of ! with respet to  (i.e., model or ountermodel) is the same as that of !
0
(Corollary 1).
As to variable forgetting:
(d) ForgetV ar(; V ) is the most general onsequene of  that is Var-independent from V
(Corollary 16).
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Now, these denitions have a suÆient level of generality to be extended to the ase where
the knowledge base  is replaed by another struture.
Thus, some of us have extended the notion of Var-independene (haraterized using
(b)) and variable forgetting to ordinal onditional funtions (represented as stratied bases)
(Lang, Marquis, & Williams, 2001). The basi purpose was to extend the \forget and
expand" approah at work for updating \at" knowledge bases (as briey disussed in
Setion 4) to updating more sophistiated epistemi states.
The ase of inomplete probabilities is also interesting sine generalizing (a), (b) and ()
will lead to the same intuitive notion
6
. As to variable forgetting, it is not hard to notie
that it orresponds to the well-known notion of marginalization.
6.2.2 Formula-variable independene in nonlassial (propositional) logis
The denition of FL- and FV-independene ( an be rewritten equivalently in a formula

0
in whih l (resp. x) does not appear) is quite general, in the sense that the logial
language and/or the onsequene relation (and thus the notion of logial equivalene) may
vary, whih enables us to draw from this priniple notions of FL- and FV-independene
(and from then on, notions of literal and variable forgetting) for nonlassial logis. This
is what has been done (at least partly) in (Lakemeyer, 1997). Here we briey onsider two
ases:
(i) sublassial logis. These logis are built on a lassial language but have a weaker on-
sequene relation than lassial logi. For instane, in most multivalued logis, due to the
fat that the exluded middle (a _ :a) is not a theorem, a formula suh as a _ (:b ^ b)
will depend both on a and on b (whereas it depends only on a in lassial logi), beause it
annot be rewritten equivalently into a formula in whih b does not appear (in partiular, a
is not always equivalent to a_(:b^b) in suh logis); on the ontrary, the formula a_(a^b)
is equivalent to a in usual multivalued logis and thus depends on a only.
(ii) modal logis. Now, the language is obtained by extending a lassial propositional lan-
guage with one or more modalities, while the onsequene relation extends that of lassial
logi (in the sense that a modality-free formula is a theorem if and only if it is a theorem
of lassial logi). Therefore, results suh as Propositions 6 and 7 still make sense and we
onjeture that they are still valid. To take an example, in the logi S5 where )  is
a theorem, a formula suh as  ^ ( _ ) is independent from  while  ^( _ )
is not.
6.2.3 Restrited queries and harateristi models
Forgetting a set of variables modies a knowledge base while preserving some of the on-
sequenes, namely, those built on variables that are not forgotten. Other frameworks are
6. This is not the ase for single probability distributions: when the knowledge base is represented by a prob-
ability distribution pr, (a) does not lead to an aeptable denition (beause a full probability distribution
on 

PS
always tell something about x); () suggests the denition 8! 2 

PS
; pr(Swith(!; x)) = pr(!),
whih leads to the deomposability of pr w.r.t. x: pr is a joint probability distribution obtained from
a probability distribution pr
PSnfxg
on 

PSnfxg
and the probability distribution pr
x
on fxg dened by
pr
x
(x) =
1
2
(= pr
x
(:x)). (b) would lead to the same denition, notiing that a full probability dis-
tribution an be expressed more ompatly by a \partial" probability distribution (here, a probability
distribution on 

PSnfxg
) from whih pr is indued by the maximum entropy priniple.
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based on restriting the possible queries in other ways, i.e., onsidering only queries in Horn
form (Kautz, Kearns, & Selman, 1995).
Reasoning with harateristi models (Kautz, Kearns, & Selman, 1993) is based on using
only a subset of models of the original formula. As for forgetting, this may inrease the
size of the representation of a knowledge base exponentially. Khardon and Roth (1996)
have shown that harateristi models an be used for eÆient reasoning on some sets of
restrited queries.
7. Conluding Remarks
We have investigated several ways of answering the key question of determining what a
propositional knowledge base tells about the (in)dependenies between variables and for-
mulas. For eah of the notions studied, we have related it to other previously known notions
and we have studied it from a omputational point of view, giving both omplexity results
and haraterization results to be used for pratial omputation. In the light of our results,
it appears that the various forms of logial independene are losely onneted. Espeially,
several of them had been proposed by dierent authors without being expliitely related.
Boutilier's inueneability and Lakemeyer's relevane of a formula to a subjet matter are
idential to FV-independene (Propositions 25 and 26). We also disussed muh related
work, and suggest some extensions to more general framework than mere propositional
logi.
The following table gives a syntheti view of many notions addressed in this paper and
the orresponding omplexity results.
Problem Notation Denition Complexity
Synt. Lit-independene Lit() \ L = ; P
Lit-independene L 67!  9 :   ; Lit() \ L = ; oNP-omplete
Dependent literals DepLit() fl j flg 7! g BH
2
-omplete
FullLit-independene L  DepLit() oNP-omplete
Lit-simplied 8l : flg 67! , l 62 Lit() NP-omplete
Lit-equivalene  
L
 ForgetLit(; Lit() n L) 
ForgetLit(; Lit() n L) 
p
2
-omplete
Problems on literals and their omplexity.
Problem Notation Denition Complexity
Synt. Var-independene V ar() \ V = ; P
Var-independene V 67!
+
 
 9 :   ; V ar() \  = ; oNP-omplete
Dependent variables DepV ar() fv j v 7!
+
 
g BH
2
-omplete
FullVar-independene V  DepV ar() oNP-omplete
Var-simplied 8v : fvg 67!
+
 
, v 62 V ar() NP-omplete
Var-equivalene  
V
 ForgetV ar(; V ar() n V ) 
ForgetV ar(; V ar() n V ) 
p
2
-omplete
Problems on variables and their omplexity.
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The fat that both notions of formula-variable independene and forgetting have been
used as key onepts in many AI elds (inluding automated reasoning, belief revision and
update, diagnosis, reasoning about ations et.) has been disussed before (Setions 1 and
4), so we will refrain from repeating it here. The gain of generality oered by the orre-
sponding literal-oriented notions introdued in this paper has also been established (e.g.,
Proposition 20), and their appliation to several AI problems (like losed-world reasoning
and belief update) has been skethed.
Primarily, one of the main motivations for the notions of formula-variable independene
and forgetting was to improve inferene from a omputational side, by enabling to fous on
relevant piees of knowledge. The extent to whih this goal an be reahed an be disussed
at the light of our omplexity results:
 Most (in)dependene relations have a high omplexity. The notions onneted to FV-
dependene (FL-dependene, full FV- and FL-dependene, inueneability, relevane
to a subjet matter and strit relevane seond form) have a omplexity at the rst
level of the polynomial hierarhy, whih means that they an be heked by a satis-
ability or/and an unsatisability solver. They beome \tratable" when syntatial
restritions are made (Proposition 11). Forgetting (literals or variables) also is om-
putationally expensive. The remaining notions are in omplexity lasses loated at
the seond level of the polynomial hierarhy. Worse, under the standard assumptions
of omplexity theory, the expliit omputation of literal or variable forgetting annot
be ahieved in polynomial spae in the general ase (Proposition 23). This pushes
towards the negative onlusion that all these notions are hard to be omputed (at
least in the worst ase) exept if the size or the syntatial form of the input enables it.
The fat that these problems fall in the seond level of the polynomial hierarhy are
not that surprising sine this is where a large part (if not the majority) of important
problems in knowledge representation
7
fall.
 But a high worst-ase omplexity does not neessarily prevent from pratial algo-
rithms! Thus, Amir and MIlraith have shown the omputational benets that an
be ahieved by struturing a KB (through the forgetting operation) so as to ahieve
inferene and onsequene nding more eÆiently (Amir & MIlraith, 2000; MIlraith
& Amir, 2001). A similar disrepany between the worst ase situation and the prati-
al ones an be observed in other domains; espeially, satisability-based hekers for
quantied boolean formulas (Biere, Cimatti, Clarke, Fujita, & Zhu, 1999; Williams,
Biere, Clarke, & Gupta, 2000) used for formal veriation purposes (bounded model
heking) exhibit interesting omputational behaviours (atually, they typially per-
form better than speialized algorithms, as shown in Rintanen, 2001), despite the
fat that they are onfronted to the problem of variable forgetting (i.e., elimination
of existentially quantied variables).
 Moreover, preproessing may play an important role. What we mean with \prepro-
essing" refers to the task of omputing (in)dependene relations and forgetting before
7. Suh as abdution, nonmonotoni inferene, belief revision, belief update, some forms of planning and
deision making.
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performing more problem-oriented tasks suh as onsequene nding, diagnosis, a-
tion/update, deision making et. Thus, Lit-simplifying (or Var(simplifying) a KB
during a preliminary o-line phase an prove helpful for improving on-line inferene
sine simpliation never inreases the size of a KB. As shown by Proposition 23, a
similar onlusion annot be drawn to what onerns forgetting. This seems to be the
prie to be paid to benet from the power of forgetting. However, this negative onlu-
sion must be tempered by the two following omments. On the one hand, forgetting is
interesting per se; it is not only a tool that an help improving inferene in some ases
but also a goal in several AI appliations. On the other hand, our omplexity results
relate to the worst ase situation, only, and, as evoked before, forgetting is feasible in
many pratial ases. Finally, let us note that there are several omplete propositional
fragments for whih forgetting is easy. Espeially, as advoated by Darwihe (1999),
ompiling a KB into a DNNF formula during an o-line step an prove pratially
valuable to ahieve forgetting in an eÆient way, provided that the size of the ompiled
form remains small enough (whih annot be guaranteed in the worst ase). Sine it
is not known whether the DNNF fragment is stritly more suint than the prime
impliates one (Darwihe & Marquis, 1999), the prime impliates fragment an also be
targeted with prot as a ompilation language for some knowledge bases; espeially,
some reent approahes to the impliit representation of prime impliates (Simon &
del Val, 2001) exhibit very signiant empirial performanes (they enable the om-
putation of sets of prime impliates ontaining up to 10
70
lauses). Aordingly, they
an prove valuable for the pratial omputing of independene and forgetting.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1 A formula  is Lit-independent from l if and only if, for any interpretation
! 2 

PS
, if ! j=  then Fore(!;:l) j= .
Proof: Assume that  is Lit-independent from l. Then, there exists a formula  in NNF
that is equivalent to , and does not ontain l. Then, for any ! 2 

PS
suh that ! j= 
we have Fore(!;:l) j= . Sine  is equivalent to , we onlude that the same property
holds for .
Assume that, for any interpretation ! 2 

PS
, ! j=  implies Fore(!;:l) j= . We
prove that  is Lit-independent from l. Indeed, let 
!
be the term whose only model is !.
The following equivalene holds:
 
_
f
!
j ! j= g

_
f
!
j ! j=  and ! 6j= lg [ f
!
j ! j=  and ! j= lg

_
f
!
j ! j=  and ! 6j= lg [ f
!
_ 
Fore(!;:l)
j ! j=  and ! j= lg
The latter step an be done beause ! j=  implies that Fore(!;:l) is also a model
of . Now, if ! 6j= l then 
!
does not ontain l. On the other hand, if ! j= l, then

!
_ 
Fore(!;:l)
an be rewritten as a onjuntion of literals not ontaining neither l nor
its negation. As a result, the above formula (whih is in NNF) does not ontain l, whih
means that  is Lit-independent from l. 
Proposition 2
(1) DepLit()  Lit();
(2) If   , then DepLit() = DepLit();
(3a) DepLit( ^ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(3b) DepLit( _ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(4) l 2 DepLit() if and only if :l 2 DepLit(:).
Proof:
1. Trivial.
2. L 7!  if and only if there exists a formula 	 that is equivalent to , and suh that
	 is syntatially Lit-independent from L. Sine   , it follows that   	.
3. Let 	 (resp. ) be a NNF formula equivalent to  (resp. ) s.t. no literal of L ours
in it. Then 	^ (resp. 	_) is a formula equivalent to ^ (resp. _), whih
is in NNF, and no literal of L ours in it.
4. Straightforward from the fat that l appears in a NNF formula  if and only if :l
appears in the NNF form of :.

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Proposition 3
(1) DepV ar()  V ar();
(2) If   , then DepV ar() = DepV ar();
(3a) DepV ar( ^ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(3b) DepV ar( _ )  DepLit() [DepLit();
(4) DepV ar(:) = DepV ar().
Proof: (1) is trivial; (2) and (3) are similar to the proof of points (2) and (3) of Propo-
sition 2, replaing \literal" by \variable", l by v, and DepLit by DepV ar. As to (4): if
x 62 DepV ar() then there exists a formula  equivalent to  in whih x does not appear;
sine x does not appear in : either, : is a formula equivalent to : in whih x does not
appear. 
Proposition 4 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
.
  is Lit-simplied if and only if the following equivalene holds: for every L  L
PS
,
 is syntatially Lit-independent from L if and only if L 67!  holds.
  is Var-simplied if and only if the following equivalene holds: for every V  PS,
 is syntatially Var-independent from V if and only if V 67!
+
 
 holds.
Proof:
 Lit-simpliation
{ ): Assume  is Lit-simplied (thus Lit() = DepLit()) and let L  L
PS
.
If  is syntatially Lit-independent from L, then L \ Lit() = ;, thus L \
DepLit() = ;, i.e., L 67! .
{ (: Assume that  is not Lit-simplied. Then there exists l 2 Lit() s.t. 
is Lit-independent from l. With L = flg, it is lear that  is syntatially
Lit-dependent on L, while Lit-independent from it, ontradition.
 Var-simpliation. The proof is similar to the Lit-simpliation ase, replaing \Lit-
independent" by \Var-independent", L by V , L
PS
by PS, l by x, Lit() by V ar().

Proposition 5 For every  from PROP
PS
, there exists a Lit-simplied formula  s.t.
  .
Proof: Sine  is Lit-independent from L n DepLit() we know that there exists a
NNF formula  equivalent to  suh that Lit() \ (L n DepLit()) = ;, i.e., suh that
Lit()  DepLit(). By point (2) of Proposition 2 we have DepLit() = DepLit().
Thus, DepLit()  Lit())  DepLit() = DepLit(), from whih we onlude that
DepLit() = Lit(), i.e.,  is Lit-simplied. 
Proposition 6 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and l be a literal of L
PS
. The next
four statements are equivalent:
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(1) l 67! ;
(2) 
l 1
j= 
l 0
;
(3)  j= 
l 0
;
(4) 
l 1
j= .
Proof:
(1)) (2): Let v the variable of l and assume that 
l 1
6j= 
l 0
, whih means that there is
a PS n fvg-world ! suh that ! j= 
l 1
^:
l 0
; sine  is equivalent to (l^
l 1
)_
(:l ^ 
l 
0), we have ! ^ flg j= 
l 1
^ l j=  and Fore(! ^ flg;:l) = ! ^ f:lg j=

l 1
^ :
l 0
; hene, Fore(! ^ flg;:l) 6j=  and therefore l 7!  by Proposition 1.
(2)) (3): Assume 
l 1
j= 
l 0
. We have the following hain of impliations:
  (l ^ 
l 1
) _ (:l ^ 
l 0
)
 j= (l ^ 
l 0
) _ (:l ^ 
l 0
)
 j= 
l 0
(3)) (1): Let us assume that  j= 
l 0
, and prove that l 67! . Indeed, the assumption
an be rewritten as:
8! 2 

PS
: (! j=  ) ! j= 
l 0
)
Now, ! j= 
l 0
is equivalent to say that hanging the truth value of l to false, ! is
still a model of . In formulas,
8! 2 

PS
: (! j=  ) Fore(!;:l) j= )
This is exatly the denition of l 67! .
(2)) (4): Same as the proof of (2)) (3).
(4)) (1): Similar to the proof of (3)) (1).

Proposition 7 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and x be a variable of PS. The next
four statements are equivalent:
(1) x 67!
+
 
;
(2) 
x 0
 
x 1
;
(3)   
x 0
;
(4)   
x 1
.
Proof: Easy onsequene of the denition of FV-independene ( is Var-independent from
x if and only if it is Lit-independent from fx;:xg), and Proposition 6). 
Proposition 8 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L be a subset of L
PS
. The next
statements are equivalent:
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(1) L 67! ;
(2) PI()  f j  is a term that does not ontain any literal from Lg;
(3) IP ()  fÆ j Æ is a lause that does not ontain any literal from Lg.
Proof:
 (1), (2):
{ ): If  is Lit-independent from L, then there exists a NNF formula  equivalent
to  s.t. Lit() \ L = ;. Clearly enough, the property Lit() \ L = ; is still
satised if  is turned into DNF, espeially when  is turned into its prime
impliant normal form. Sine two equivalent formulas have the same prime
impliants, no term of PI() ontains a literal from L.
{ (: PI() is a NNF formula that is equivalent to  and syntatially Lit-
independent from L. Hene,  is Lit-independent from L.
 (1), (3): Similar to the prime impliant situation, using CNF instead of DNF.

Proposition 9 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V be a subset of PS. The next
statements are equivalent:
(1) V 67!
+
 
;
(2) PI()  f j  is a term that does not ontain any variable from V g;
(3) IP ()  fÆ j Æ is a lause that does not ontain any variable from V g.
Proof: Easy onsequene of the denition of FV-independene, plus Proposition 9 above. 
Proposition 10 FL dependene, FV dependene, full FL dependene and full
FV dependene are NP-omplete.
Proof:
 FL dependene
{ Membership. In order to show that  is Lit-dependent on L, it is suÆient to
guess a literal l from L and a (V ar() n fV ar(l)g)-world ! that is a model of

l 1
but not a model of 
l 0
. These tests an be ahieved in time polynomial
in jj.
{ Hardness. Let us onsider the mapping M s.t. M() = h ^ new; newi, where
new is a propositional variable that does not our in . Clearly enough, M()
an be omputed in time polynomial in jj. Moreover,  is satisable if and only
if  ^ new is Lit-dependent on fnewg.
 FV dependene
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{ Membership. In order to show that  is Var-dependent on V , it is suÆient to
guess a variable x from V and a (V ar() n fxg)-world ! that is not a model of
the formula 
x 0
, 
x!1
. This test an be ahieved in time polynomial in jj.
{ Hardness. Similar to the hardness proof of FL-dependene, replaing \Lit-
dependent" by \Var-dependent".
 full FL dependene
{ Membership.  is fully Lit-dependent on L = fl
1
; :::; l
n
g if and only if 
l
1
 1
6j=

l
1
 0
and ... and 
l
n
 1
6j= 
l
n
 0
holds. Equivalently,  is fully Lit-dependent
on L = fl
1
; :::; l
n
g if and only if the formula rename
1
(
l
1
 1
^ :
l
1
 0
) ^ ::: ^
rename
n
(
l
n
 1
^:
l
n
 0
) is satisable, where eah rename
i
is a renaming that
maps variables to new symbols (in a uniform way). Sine this formula an be
omputed in time polynomial in jj+ jV j, the membership of full FL depen-
dene to NP follows.
{ Hardness. Full FL-dependene and FL-dependene oinide in the ase in whih
L is omposed of a single literal. Sine the NP-hardness of FL-dependene has
been proved using a set L omposed of a single literal, the NP-hardness of full
FL dependene follows.
 full FV dependene
{ Membership.  is fully Var-dependent on V = fx
1
; :::; x
n
g if and only if  6

x
1
 0
and ... and  6 
x
n
 0
holds. Equivalently,  is fully Var-dependent on
V = fx
1
; :::; x
n
g if and only if the formula rename
1
(
x
1
 0
)^:::^rename
n
(

x
n
 0
) is satisable, where eah rename
i
is a renaming that maps variables to
new symbols (in a uniform way). Sine this formula an be omputed in time
polynomial in jj+jV j, the membership of full FV dependene to NP follows.
{ Hardness. Full FV-dependene and FV-dependene oinide if L is omposed of
a single literal. Sine the NP-hardness of FV-dependene has been proved using a
set L omposed of a single literal, the NP-hardness of full FV-dependene follows.

Proposition 11 Whenever  belongs to a lass C of CNF formulas that is tratable for
lausal query answering (i.e., there exists a polytime algorithm to determine whether  j= 
for any CNF formula ) and stable for variable instantiation (i.e., replaing in  2 C any
variable by true or by false gives a formula that still belongs to C) then FL dependene,
FV dependene, full FL dependene and full FV dependene are in P.
Proof: This is a straightforward onsequene of Propositions 6 and 7. When  belongs to
a lass C of formulas that is tratable for lausal query answering and stable for variable
instantiation, we an easily hek whether  j= 
x 0
and 
x 0
j=  holds. 
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Proposition 12 Lit-simplified formula and Var-simplified formula are NP-omplete.
Proof:
 Lit-simpliation
{ Membership. Easy onsequene of the fat that Lit-simplified formula is
a restrition of full FL dependene that is in NP (and NP is losed under
polynomial redutions).
{ Hardness. We prove that a formula , built over an alphabet X = fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g,
is satisable if and only if formula  is L-simplied, where
 = ( _ [X=:X℄) ^
^
x
i
2X
x
i
, y
i
where [X=:X℄ is the formula obtained by replaing in  eah ourrene of x
i
(resp. :x
i
) with :x
i
(resp. x
i
).
First, if  is not satisable, neither [X=:X℄ is, thus ( _ [X=:X℄) is not
satisable. As a result,  is not satisable, thus it is not Lit-simplied, beause
DepLit() = ; but  mentions variables x
i
and y
i
.
Assume  satisable. Clearly,  is satisable as well: let ! be a model of . We
prove that  is Lit-simplied by showing that it is Lit-dependent on eah literal it
ontains. We have Lit() = fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
; y
1
; : : : ; y
n
;:x
1
; : : : ;:x
n
;:y
1
; : : : ;:y
n
g.
Let l
i
2 Lit().
(1) Assume that ! j= l
i
. Then, Fore(!;:l
i
) 6j= . Indeed, let V ar(l
i
) = x
i
(resp. y
i
): ! satises x
i
, y
i
so hanging the truth value of x
i
only (resp. y
i
only) leads to a model that does not satisfy x
i
, y
i
.
(2) Otherwise, we have ! j= :l
i
. Replaing l
i
by :l
i
in the proof of ase (1)
enables deriving the expeted onlusion.
{ Var-simpliation
 Membership. Easy onsequene of the fat that Var-simplified formula
is a restrition of full FV dependene that is in NP (and NP is losed
under polynomial redution).
 Hardness. The proof is similar to the proof of NP-hardness of Lit-simplified
formula, replaing \Lit-simplied" with \Var-simplied".

Proposition 13
1. Determining whether DepLit() = L (where L is a set of literals), and determining
whether DepV ar() = X (where X is a set of variables) is BH
2
-omplete.
2. The searh problem onsisting in omputing DepLit() (respetively DepV ar()) is
in F
p
2
and is both NP and oNP-hard.
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Proof:
 Determining whether DepLit() = L is BH
2
-omplete.
{ Membership.
DepLit() = L if and only if (i) l 7!  holds for every l 2 L and (ii) l 67! 
holds for every l 2 Lit() n L; the set of instanes h; Li suh that (i) holds is
the union of a linear number of problems in NP, thus it is in NP; similarly, the
set of instanes h; Li suh that (ii) holds is a problem in oNP. This proves the
membership to BH
2
of the problem of determining whether DepLit() = L.
{ Hardness.
Let h; i be a pair of propositional formulas. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that  and   do not share any variable and thatX = V ar() = fx
1
; :::; x
n
g,
V ar( ) = fz
1
; :::; z
p
g. Furthermore we assume that X 6= ; (if it were not the ase
it would then be suÆient then to replae  by  ^ (t _ :t) before performing
the redution). We prove that h; i is a positive instane of sat-unsat, i.e., 
is satisable and   is unsatisable, if and only if DepLit( ^ : ) = Lit(())
where () = (_[X=:X℄)^
V
x
i
2X
x
i
, y
i
as in a previous proof (note that
() and   do not share any variables).
(i) if  is satisable and   is unsatisable, then () is Lit-simplied a-
ording to the previous proof and thus DepLit(()) = Lit(()) whereas
DepLit(: ) = ;, whih together entail that DepLit(() ^ : ) = Lit(()).
(ii) Assume that  is unsatisable and DepLit(() ^ : ) = Lit(()). Then
() is not simplied (reall that V ar() is not empty and hene so is Lit(())),
thus DepLit(())  Lit(()). Now, DepLit(()^: ) = Lit(()) implies
DepLit(() ^ : ) \ Lit( ) = ;, whih is possible only if   is a tautology (be-
ause () and   do not share any variables); but in this ase, () ^ :  is
inonsistent and thus DepLit(() ^ : ) = ;, hene, Lit(()) = ;, whih is
ontraditory.
(iii) Assume that   is satisable and DepLit(() ^ : ) = Lit(()).
The seond ondition an hold only if () is unsatisable, hene not Lit-
simplied (sine Lit(()) 6= ;), so  is unsatisable as well; this takes us
bak to the ase (ii), whih leads us to the same ontradition again.
 Computing DepLit() is in F
p
2
sine FL dependene is in NP and DepLit() 
Lit() (hene, it is suÆient to test for every l 2 Lit() whether or not  is Lit-
independent from it). It is also both NP-hard and oNP-hard. NP-hardness is showed
by the following polynomial redution from sat: A CNF formula F is satisable
if and only if F is valid or DepLit(F ) 6= ;; learly enough, valid CNF formulas
an be reognized in polynomial time. Thus, sat an be solved if we know how to
ompute DepLit() for any , whih shows that omputing DepLit() is NP-hard.
The proof of oNP-hardness is similar (F is unsatisable if and only if F is not valid
and DepLit(F ) = ;).
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 Determining whether DepV ar() = V is BH
2
-omplete. Membership follows easily
from the membership of the orresponding problem forDepLit(). Hardness is similar
to the hardness proof for DepLit() = L.
 Computing DepV ar() is in F
p
2
and is both NP-hard and oNP-hard. Similar to the
orresponding result for DepLit().

Proposition 14 The set of models of ForgetLit(; flg) an be expressed as:
Mod(ForgetLit(; flg)) = Mod() [ fFore(!;:l) j ! j= g
= f! j Fore(!; l) j= g
Proof: The proof is obtained immediately from the denition. 
Proposition 15 The set of models of ForgetLit(; L) an be expressed as:
Mod(ForgetLit(; L)) = f! j Fore(!;L
1
) j=  where L
1
 Lg
Proof: By indution on jLj. The base ase in whih L is empty is trivial. Let now assume
that the property holds for any L omposed of k elements, and prove that it holds as well
for L [ flg.
By denition,
! j= ForgetLit(; L [ flg)
if and only if ! j= ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; L); flg))
if and only if ! j= ForgetLit(; L) or Fore(!; l) j= ForgetLit(; L)
if and only if Fore(!;L
0
) j= ForgetLit(; L) where L
0
 flg
Using the indution hypothesis, we an express the set of models of ForgetLit(; L) as
the models !
0
suh that Fore(!
0
; L
1
) j= , where L
1
is any subset of L. As a result,
! j= ForgetLit(; L [ flg)
if and only if Fore(!;L
0
) = !
0
and Fore(!
0
; L
1
) j= ; where L
0
 flg and L
1
 L
if and only if Fore(!;L
0
1
) j=  where L
0
1
 L [ flg
As a result, the models of ForgetLit(; L) are the models that an be mapped into
models of  by foring a subset of literals in L to beome true. 
Proposition 16 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
. ForgetLit(; L) is
the logially strongest onsequene of  that is Lit-independent from L (up to logial equiv-
alene).
Proof: By indution on jLj. The base ase jLj = 0 is trivial. Let us now assume that
the proposition holds for every jLj  k and show that it remains true when jLj = k + 1.
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Let L = L
0
[ flg. By the indution hypothesis, we an assume that ForgetLit(; L
0
)
is the most general onsequene of  that is Lit-independent from L
0
. For the sake
of simpliity, let 
0
denote this formula. It remains to show that ForgetLit(; L) =
ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; L
0
); flg) = ForgetLit(
0
; flg) is the most general onsequene of

0
that is Lit-independent from l. Two ases are to be onsidered:
 l = x. ForgetLit(
0
; x) is Lit-independent from x if and only if
ForgetLit(
0
; x) j= ForgetLit(
0
; x)
x 0
holds. We have
(
0
x 1
_ (:x ^
0
))
x 0
 (
0
x 1
_ 
0
x 0
)
This formula learly is a logial onsequene of ForgetLit(
0
; fxg). Hene ForgetLit(
0
; x)
is Lit-independent from x. ForgetLit(
0
; x) is a logial onsequene of 
0
. Indeed,
for every 
0
2 PROP
PS
, x 2 PS, we have 
0
 (x^
0
x 1
)_ (:x^
0
x 0
). It remains
to show that every logial onsequene  of 
0
that is Lit-independent from x is a
logial onsequene of ForgetLit(
0
; x). Let  any formula s.t. 
0
j=  holds and
 j= 
x 0
. Sine 
0
 (x ^ 
0
x 1
) _ (:x ^ 
0
x 0
) holds, we have 
0
j=  if and only
if both (x ^ 
0
x 1
) j=  and (:x ^ 
0
x 0
) j=  hold. Thus, in order to show that
ForgetLit(
0
; x) j=  holds, it is suÆient to prove that 
0
x 1
j=  holds. Suppose
that is not the ase. Then, there exists an impliant  of 
0
x 1
that is not an impliant
of . However, sine (x ^ 
0
x 1
) j=  holds, we know that (x ^ ) is an impliant of
. Sine  is equivalent to the onjuntion of its prime impliates, there neessarily
exists a prime impliate  of  s.t. (x^ ) j=  and  6j=  hold. This imposes that x
belongs to  but no literal of  belongs to . By onstrution, 
x 0
is an impliate of

x 0
and 
x 0
is stritly stronger than . Sine  j= 
x 0
holds,  j= 
x 0
holds
as well. This ontradits the fat that  is a prime impliate of .
 l = :x. The demonstration is similar, mutatis mutandis.

Proposition 17 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.
ForgetLit( _ ; L)  ForgetLit(; L) _ ForgetLit(; L):
Proof: The laim an be easily proved from Proposition 15. Indeed, the models of
ForgetLit(_; L) are the models ! suh that Fore(!;L
1
) j= _, where L
1
 L. Now,
Fore(!;L
1
) j=  _  holds if and only if Fore(!;L
1
) j=  holds or Fore(!;L
1
) j= 
holds.
On the other hand, the models of ForgetLit(; L) _ ForgetLit(; L) are those suh that
Fore(!;L
1
) j=  or Fore(!;L
1
) j=  for some L
1
 L. This is equivalent to the above
ondition. 
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Proposition 18 Let  be a onsistent term from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.
ForgetLit(; L) 
V
l2s:t:l 62L
l.
Proof: We rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For any onsistent term , we have ForgetLit(; l)   n flg.
Proof (lemma):
ase 1 l 2 , i.e.,  = l ^ 
0
.
ForgetLit(; l)  
l 1
_ (:l _ )  
0
  n flg.
ase 2 :l 2 , i.e.,  = :l ^ 
0
.
ForgetLit(; l)  ? _      n flg.
ase 3 l 62  and :l 62 .
ForgetLit(; l)   _ (:l _ )     n flg.

A straightforward indution on L ompletes the proof. 
Proposition 19 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and L  L
PS
.
IP (ForgetLit(; L)) = fÆ j Æ 2 IP () and Lit(Æ) \ L = ;g.
Proof:
 : Let Æ 2 IP (ForgetLit(; L)). Sine  j= ForgetLit(; L) and ForgetLit(; L) j=
Æ hold, Æ is an impliate of . Hene, there exists a prime impliate Æ
0
of  s.t. Æ
0
j= Æ
holds. Sine Æ does not ontain any literal from L, this is also the ase for Æ
0
. Thus,
Æ
0
is a logial onsequene of  that is Lit-independent from L. As a onsequene of
Proposition 16, it must be the ase that ForgetLit(; L) j= Æ
0
. Hene, there exists a
prime impliate Æ
00
of ForgetLit(; L) s.t. Æ
00
j= Æ
0
holds. This implies that Æ
00
j= Æ
holds as well, and sine both lauses are prime impliates of the same formula, they
are equivalent. But this implies that Æ  Æ
0
holds, whih ompletes the proof.
 : Let Æ be a prime impliate of  that does not ontain any literal from L. Æ is
Lit-independent from L. Sine Æ is an impliate of , it must also be an impliate of
ForgetLit(; L). Subsequently, there exists a prime impliate Æ
0
of ForgetLit(; L)
s.t. Æ
0
j= Æ holds. Sine  j= ForgetLit(; L) and ForgetLit(; L) j= Æ
0
both hold,
we have  j= Æ
0
as well. Hene, there exists a prime impliate Æ
00
of  s.t. Æ
00
j= Æ
0
holds. Therefore, Æ
00
j= Æ holds and sine both lauses are prime impliates of the same
formula, they are equivalent. But this implies that Æ  Æ
0
holds, whih ompletes the
proof.

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Proposition 20 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V  PS. We have
ForgetV ar(; V )  ForgetLit(; L
V
)
Proof: By indution on jV j. The proposition trivially holds for jV j = 0. Let us assume it
is true whenever jV j = k. Let V = fv
1
; :::; v
k+1
g. By denition, we have
ForgetV ar(; V ) = ForgetV ar(ForgetV ar(; fv
1
; :::; v
k
g); fv
k+1
g)
By the indution hypothesis, ForgetV ar(; V ) is equivalent to ForgetV ar(; fv
k+1
g),
where  is dened as:
 = ForgetLit(; fx;x 2 fv
1
; : : : ; v
k
gg [ f:x;x 2 fv
1
; : : : ; v
k
gg)
We have ForgetV ar(; V )  ForgetV ar(; fv
k+1
g). By denition,
ForgetV ar(; v
k+1
) = 
v
k+1
 0
_ 
v
k+1
 1
:
We also have
ForgetLit(; fv
k+1
;:v
k+1
g)
= ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; fv
k+1
g); f:v
k+1
g)
= ForgetLit((:v
k+1
^
v
k+1
 0
) _ 
v
k+1
 1
; f:v
k+1
g)
= (v
k+1
^ ((:v
k+1
^ 
v
k+1
 0
) _ 
v
k+1
 1
)
v
k+1
 1
) _ ((:v
k+1
^
v
k+1
 0
) _ 
v
k+1
 1
)
v
k+1
 0
:
This simplies to (v
k+1
^ 
v
k+1
 1
) _ 
v
k+1
 0
_ 
v
k+1
 1
, whih is also equivalent to

v
k+1
 0
_ 
v
k+1
 1
, hene equivalent to ForgetV ar(; fv
k+1
g). Consequently, we have
ForgetV ar(; V )
 ForgetLit(ForgetLit(; fx;x 2 fv
1
; : : : ; v
k
gg [ f:x;x 2 fv
1
; : : : ; v
k
gg); fv
k+1
;:v
k+1
g)
 ForgetLit(; V ):

Proposition 21 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
, and V be a subset of PS. If
V 67!
+
 
, then ForgetV ar( ^ ; V )   ^ ForgetV ar(; V ).
Proof: Let us onsider the ase where V = fvg. By denition, we have ForgetV ar( ^
; fvg) = ( ^ )
v 0
_ ( ^ )
v 1
. Equivalently, ForgetV ar( ^ ; fvg)  (
v 0
^

v 0
) _ (
v 1
^ 
v 1
). When v 67!
+
 
, we have   
v 0
 
v 1
. Aordingly,
ForgetV ar( ^ ; fvg)   ^ (
v 0
_ 
v 1
)   ^ Forget(; fvg). A straightforward
indution ompletes the proof. 
Proposition 22 Let ,  be two formulas from PROP
PS
, and P , Q, Z be three disjoint
sets of variables from PS (suh that V ar() [ V ar()  P [Q [ Z). It holds:
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1. If  does not ontain any variable from Z
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= 
if and only if
 j= ForgetLit( ^; L
 
P
[ L
Z
)
2. In the general ase:
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= 
if and only if
 j= ForgetLit( ^ :ForgetLit( ^ :; L
Z
[ L
 
P
); L
Z
[ L
 
P
)
where CIRC is irumsription as dened in (MCarthy, 1986).
Proof:
1. This is a onsequene of Theorem 2.5 from (Przymusinski, 1989). This theorem
states that if  does not ontain literals from Z, then CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= 
holds if and only if there is no lause  s.t.  does not ontain any literal from
L
 
P
[ L
Z
and  j= : _  but  6j= . This is equivalent to state that, if  does
not ontain literals from Z, then CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=  holds if and only if, for
every lause  ontaining only literals from L
+
P
[ L
Q
, we have  ^  j=  if and
only if  j= . It is easy to see that the equivalene is preserved would any formula
 Lit-independent from L
 
P
[ L
Z
be onsidered (any formula an be turned into an
equivalent CNF formula). Thus, Theorem 2.5 an be rephrased in forgetting terms: if
 does not ontain variables from Z, then CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=  holds if and only
if  ^  
L
+
P
[L
Q
 if and only if  j= ForgetLit( ^ ; L
 
P
[ L
Z
).
2. This is a onsequene of Theorem 2.6 from (Przymusinski, 1989). This theorem
states that CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=  holds if and only if  j=  or there exists a
formula 	 s.t. 	 does not ontain any literal from L
 
P
[ L
Z
,  j=  _ 	 holds and
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= :	. It is easy to see that suh a formula 	 exists if and only if
the onjuntion  of all the formulas 	 suh that 	 does not ontain any literal from
L
 
P
[L
Z
and  j= _	 holds is s.t. CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= :. Sine  j= _	 holds
if and only if ^: j= 	 holds,  is equivalent to ForgetLit(^:; L
 
P
[L
Z
). Thus,
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=  holds if and only if  j=  holds or CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=
:ForgetLit( ^ :; L
 
P
[ L
Z
) holds. In the ase where  j=  holds,  ^ : is
inonsistent, so it is also the ase of ForgetLit( ^ :; L
 
P
[ L
Z
). Thus, if  j= 
holds, CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= :ForgetLit(^:; L
 
P
[L
Z
) holds as well. Aordingly,
CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j=  holds if and only if CIRC(; hP;Q;Zi) j= :ForgetLit( ^
:; L
 
P
[ L
Z
) holds. Sine ForgetLit( ^ :; L
 
P
[ L
Z
) does not ontain any literal
from Z, the point just above enables onluding the proof.
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
Proposition 23 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and let L be a subset of L
PS
. In the
general ase, there is no propositional formula  equivalent to ForgetLit(; L) s.t. the size
of  is polynomially bounded in jj+ jLj, unless NP \ oNP  P/poly.
Proof: The justiation is twofold:
(1) ForgetLit(; L) is the logially strongest onsequene of  that is Lit-independent
from L. Consequently, for every formula  2 PROP
PS
, we have  j=  if and only if
ForgetLit(; L) j= , where L = Lit() n Lit(). Beause ForgetLit(; L) depends only
on literals of Lit() \ Lit(), it is an interpolant of  and , i.e., a formula ' s.t.  j= '
and ' j=  hold; thus we have  j= ForgetLit(; Lit() n Lit()) j= .
(2) the existene of a propositional formula, interpolant of  and , and of size polynomially
bounded in jj + jj would imply that NP \ oNP  P/poly (Boppana & Sipser, 1990),
whih is onsidered very unlikely in omplexity theory. 
Proposition 24 Lit-equivalene and Var-equivalene are 
p
2
-omplete.
Proof:
 Var-equivalene.
{ Membership: In order to hek the membership to the omplementary problem,
guessing a lause  built up from V , and heking that ( j=  and  6j= ) or
( 6j=  and  j= ) is suÆient. The hek step an be easily aomplished
in polynomial time when an NP orale is available. Hene, the omplementary
problem belongs to 
p
2
.
{ Hardness: Let M be the mapping that assoiates the triple h; true;Ai to the
quantied boolean formula 8A9B (where fA;Bg is a partition of V ar()).
Clearly enough, M is polytime. Moreover, we have:
8A9B is valid if and only if j= 9B : 
if and only if j= ForgetV ar(; B)
if and only if  
A
true
Sine the validity problem for 2-qbf formulas is 
p
2
-omplete, this proves the

p
2
-hardness of Var-equivalene.
 Lit-equivalene.
{ Membership: See the membership proof above, replaing \built up from V "by
\s.t. Lit()  L".
{ Hardness: LetM be the mapping that assoiates h;; V i to h;; L
V
i. Clearly
enough, M(h;; V i) an be omputed in time polynomial in jh;; V ij. We
have shown that  and  are Var-equivalent given V if and only if  and  are
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Lit-equivalent given L
V
. Hene, M is a polynomial many-one redution from
Var-equivalene to Lit-equivalene. Sine Var-equivalene is 
p
2
-hard,
this is also the ase for Lit-equivalene.

Proposition 25 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is inu-
eneable from V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V .
Proof: Proposition 4 from (Boutilier, 1994) states that  is inueneable from V if and
only if there exists a prime impliant of  that ontains a variable from V , where V is the
set of ontrollable variables. Proposition 9 ompletes the proof. 
Proposition 26 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is relevant
to V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V .
Proof: The proof is trivial from Proposition 9. 
Proposition 27 Let  be a formula from PROP
PS
and V a subset of PS.  is stritly
relevant to V if and only if  is Var-dependent on V and Var-independent from V ar()nV .
Proof: Easy from the denition of strit relevane, plus Proposition 9 ( is Var-dependent
from every variable ourring in a prime impliate of  and Var-independent from all the
remaining variables). 
Proposition 28
(1) strit relevane of a formula to a subjet matter (Lakemeyer, 1995) is 
p
2
-
omplete.
(2) strit relevane of a formula to a subjet matter (Lakemeyer, 1997) is BH
2
-
omplete.
Proof:
 strit relevane (Lakemeyer, 1995)
{ Membership. Let us onsider the omplementary problem. Guess a lause ,
hek that it does not ontain any variable from V (this an be ahieved in time
polynomial in jj + jV j, hene in time polynomial in jj + jV j sine no prime
impliate of  an inlude a variable that does not our in ). Then hek that
it is an impliate of  (one all to an NP orale) and hek that every sublause
of  obtained by removing from it one of its k literals is not an impliate of 
(k alls to an NP orale). Sine only k + 1 alls to suh an orale are required
to hek that  is a prime impliate of , the omplementary problem of strit
relevane belongs to 
p
2
. Hene, strit relevane belongs to 
p
2
.
{ Hardness. Let fA;Bg be a partition of V ar() (for any formula ). 8A9B is
valid if and only if every prime impliate of  that ontains a variable from A
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also ontains a variable from B if and only if every prime impliate of  ontains
a variable from B (sine V ar() = A [B) if and only if  is stritly relevant to
B.
 strit relevane (Lakemeyer, 1997)
{ Membership: Straightforward from Propositions 27 and 10.
{ Hardness: By exhibiting a polynomial redution from sat-unsat to strit rel-
evane of a formula to a subjet matter. To any pair h;  i of propo-
sitional formulas, let rename( ) be a formula obtained from  by renaming its
variables. Obviously,
(i) rename( ) is satisable if and only if  is.
Now, let new be a new variable, let
 =  ^ new ^ :rename( )
and V = V ar() [ fnewg. By Proposition 8,  is Var-dependent on V if and
only if there is a prime impliant of  mentioning a variable from V , i.e., if and
only if  ^ :rename( ) is satisable, thus, using (i):
(ii)  is Var-dependent on V if and only if both  and : are satisable.
Then, again after Proposition 8,  is Var-independent from V ar() n V =
V ar(rename( )) if and only if no prime impliant of  mentions a variable
from V ar(rename( )), i.e., if and only if rename( ) is unsatisable, thus, using
(i):
(iii)  is Var-independent from V ar() n V if and only if  is satisable.
Thus, from Proposition 27, (ii) and (iii), we get that  is stritly relevant to V
if and only if  is satisable and rename( ) is not.

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Appendix B: Glossary
Here is a small glossary of useful terms with the plae where their denition an be found.
PROP
V
propositional language generated by V Setion 2.1
L
V
set of literals built up from V Setion 2.1
L
+
V
set of positive literals built up from V Setion 2.1
L
 
V
set of negative literals built up from V Setion 2.1
V ar() set of propositional variables appearing in  Setion 2.1
NNF negation normal form Setion 2.1
Lit() set of literals ourring in the NNF of  Setion 2.1
!
V
a V -world (instantiations of all variables of V ) Setion 2.1


V
set of all V -worlds Setion 2.1
! world (full instaniation) Setion 2.1
Mod() set of models of  Setion 2.1
for(S) formula suh that Mod() = S Setion 2.1

x 0
Setion 2.1

x 1
Setion 2.1

l 1
Setion 2.1
Fore(!; l) Setion 2.1
IP () set of prime impliates of  Setion 2.1
PI() set of prime impliants of  Setion 2.1
BH
2
, oBH
2
Setion 2.2

p
2
, 
p
2
, 
p
2
Setion 2.2
syntatial Lit-dependene Denition 1
syntatial Var-dependene Denition 2
l 7!  (semantial) Lit-dependene Denition 3
DepLit() literals suh that l 7!  Denition 3
v 7!
+
 
 (semantial) Var-dependene Denition 4
DepLit() variables suh that l 7!  Denition 4
Lit-simplied Denition 6
Var-simplied Denition 6
ForgetLit(; L) literal forgetting Denition 7
ForgetV ar(; L) variable forgetting Denition 8
 
L
 Lit-equivalene Denition 9
 
V
 Var-equivalene Denition 9
inueneability Denition 10
relevane to a subjet matter Denition 11
strit relevane to a subjet matter Denition 12
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